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Current systems used to control unmanned assets and maintain command and 
control networks typically rely upon persistent signals. However, the Department of 
Defense (DoD) predicts that adversaries will be able to detect, geolocate, and target 
through electromagnetic (EM) spectrum operations in the future operating environment. 
Unable to rely upon constant interconnection, the DOD must begin to reconsider the 
nature and behavior of its networks. In 2011, Bordetsky and Netzer proposed “networks 
that do not exist” as a potential solution.  They envision multi-domain networks whose 
links connect only long enough to transmit critical information securely. The links 
quickly disconnect, leaving no trace electromagnetically.  
The DoD lacks sufficient research that evaluates the merits of short-living 
network solutions. Without adequate research, the future DOD may either unnecessarily 
expose its forces to adversaries through the networks or impair decision-making by 
choosing not to communicate because of the risk of detection. In this study, we design 
projectile-based mesh networking prototypes as one potential type of short-living 
network node and use the projectiles to observe some of the merits and challenges of 
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Current communication systems for controlling unmanned systems (UXS) and 
maintaining command and control typically rely upon robust and persistent signals. 
However, recent developments in cyberspace and electromagnetic (EM) spectrum 
operations promise to challenge the Department of Defense’s (DOD) reliance upon 
persistent connections in time and space (Department of the Navy [DON], 2015). The 
recently published Marine Corps Operating Concept states the situation in the battle of 
signatures section: “[t]omorrow’s fights will involve conditions in which “to be detected 
is to be targeted is to be killed” (United States Marine Corps [USMC], 2016a, p. 10). 
Advances in EM geolocation technology threaten to spread the ability to target 
forces by their EM signals from strictly high-end adversaries to a much wider array of 
threats. This means that communicating and controlling through persistent signals could 
soon be the operational equivalent of setting up an ambush only to have a team member 
stand up and loudly announce all friendly positions. Operating persistent data networks 
also allows adversaries to continuously observe DOD forces and our coalition partner 
networks, providing greater opportunity to discover our vulnerabilities. As EM and cyber 
warfare become prominent warfighting considerations, technological maturation in fields 
such as autonomy may allow the DOD to reconsider the fundamental qualities of its 
networks. Autonomous assets promise to function without the need for persistent 
connections. Significant research continues for the purpose of discovering the 
possibilities of operating autonomous systems. Singer’s popular book, Wired for War 
(2009), presents a few of those possibilities. Examining how information might flow 
when autonomous systems are operational is an interesting sub-task of that research. The 
autonomous system information flow question feeds nicely into research that continues in 
mesh networking.  
In 2011, Bordetsky and Netzer proposed “networks that do not exist” as a 
potential solution.  They envision multi-domain networks whose links connect only long 
enough to transmit critical information securely. The links quickly disconnect, leaving no 
trace electromagnetically. Bordetsky and Netzer labeled disruption-based or bursty 
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tactical networks. In Bordetsky and Netzer’s hypothesized network, nodes would 
advertise, authenticate, determine routes, transmit critical data, acknowledge receipt, and 
disconnect—all before an adversary is able detect that the network exists. The receiving 
mesh nodes would store the critical data and then simply wait for another burst, or they 
might physically travel within range of other nodes to start a new burst at a different 
discrete moment in time, potentially at a location far-removed from the first burst.  
The possible applications for such a network are very interesting to consider. 
Bordetsky, Benson, and Hughes (2016) conceptualize that “hard to detect-hard to 
compromise” nodes could support the Littoral Combat Ship’s (LCS) new operational 
roles in the littoral combat area. In an example case proposed by Bordetsky (2016), the 
LCS links to autonomous data-collection systems by shooting projectiles with mesh 
networking payloads embedded. The payloads communicate in burst transmissions 
between the ship, fast patrol boats, and unmanned assets, perhaps during moments of 
cube satellite orbital node availability, “all in a coordinated dance” (Englehorn, 2017). In 
less than eight seconds, the projectiles are destroyed, leaving an adversary with only 
vague knowledge that an event had occurred. The disruption-based networking approach 
Bordetsky proposes in littoral combat is an interesting case. What other tactical or 
operational applications might also be a fit? Where would disruption-based networks be 
inappropriate? What is the best way to employ a disruption-based network? What are 
desirable features of nodes within such a network? What type of features are desirable for 
routing, authentication, and data transfer protocols? 
The problem is that very little research has been done to evaluate the merits and 
challenges of operating disruption-based networks. There are very few available 
networking devices that are designed to be short living and highly mobile. Bordetsky’s 
hypothesized projectile does not yet exist commercially. Without sufficient examination, 
the future DOD could either unnecessarily expose its forces to EM detection and 
targeting by communicating persistently or conversely induce poor decision-making by 
deciding not to communicate in light of the adversarial threat.  
This thesis represents a beginning for disruption-based networking research using 
short-living and highly mobile nodes. It is presented as a proof of concept. Our initial 
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efforts to locate and acquire short-living, highly mobile nodes for testing were not 
successful. Fortunately, maturing mesh networking technologies and the reduced size and 
cost of computing assets make it possible to create expendable, short-living network 
nodes of our own. In this thesis, we design projectile-based mesh networking prototypes 
and experiment with them. Projectiles are simply one potential type of short-living 
network node. There are many other types that may also work. However, we use 
projectiles to observe some of the merits and challenges of moving from persistent signal 
networks to cluster-based networks established only by disruption. Projectiles by their 
nature are short-living. In this research, we limit our communications window to the 
duration of the projectile’s flight. In summary, we examine information flow in a network 
organized to be discretionary in time and space for the purpose of examining the 
feasibility of bursty-tactical networks. 
A. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This study examines information patterns in a network that has been organized in 
a fundamentally different way—discretionary in time and space. We observe and record 
some of the challenges of moving from persistent signal networks to cluster-based 
networks interconnected only by disruption.  
The primary question addressed in this research is the following:  
How does information flow in networks that are interconnected only by 
disruption? 
By observing some of the challenges of operating short-living nodes, this research 
ultimately collects insights about desirable operating features of the nodes themselves. 
Because we prototype nodes for a proof of concept, we also inform corollary objectives 
that include exploring the coupling of additive manufacturing with low-cost technologies, 
and potential fits for tactical employment of projectile-based nodes. 
B. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The research question explores information flow in a disruption-based network 
prototype designed as a way to support command and control in EM-hostile 
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environments. It focuses on observing the behaviors of the network and the nodes in 
order to postulate about desirable features of the nodes and their interactions. This thesis 
remains purposefully in the unclassified domain, which significantly limits its scope. 
However, it preserves the opportunity to reach a broader DOD audience with the hope to 
inspire follow-on work. 
We do not use electromagnetic detection tools in order to attempt to geo-locate 
our experimental nodes during the duration of their interactions. That is beyond the scope 
of this work; rather, we focus on the selection of components and prototyping projectile-
based nodes. This work is accomplished through basic experimentation, using existing 
and inexpensive commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components, and does not attempt to 
modify manufacturer-set protocols in order to optimize results.  
C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Chapter II contains a literature review of relevant supporting research, theory, and 
concepts. Chapter III describes the research design and experimental modeling conducted 
to demonstrate the possibility of operating with network nodes that communicate only by 
disruption. Chapter IV provides the necessary technical background for the reader to 
understand the experimentation results. Chapter V recounts the prototyping process and 
provides observations and conclusions. Chapter VI summarizes the significant findings 
and provides recommendations for future work.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section reviews 
networking in the future operating environment. The future operating environment is a 
significant driver of research in operating communication networks outside of persistent 
signal architectures. The second section addresses the current state of our knowledge of 
networks that depart from persistent signal architectures. The first and second sections 
are intended to frame the basis for the proposal for researching bursty-networking nodes.  
The final section reviews current network science research for networks that 
display bursty behavior. Although the networks discussed in the final section expand 
beyond telecommunication-type networks, they are a vital part of the total body of 
knowledge pertaining to network behavior in conditions when connections are not 
persistent.  
A. NETWORKING IN THE FUTURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 
The DOD’s position is that there is a growing need to evolve the way command 
and control is exercised. According to Joint Publication 3-0,  
the electromagnetic spectrum, which has become increasingly complex, 
contested, and congested as technology has advanced, can significantly 
affect joint force operations. Operational experiences demonstrate not only 
how successful control of the EMS can influence the outcome of the 
conflict, but highlight U.S. dependence on the EMS in order to 
successfully operate. (2011, p.V-43) 
In order to illustrate the growing need for alternative networking solutions, 
consider the Navy and the Marine Corps perspectives in the following sections.  
1. Naval Combat in the Littorals 
Operating unopposed since the end of the cold war, the Navy has become used to 
freely sharing information (Angevine, 2011). The Navy developed robust systems that 
equip its commanders with unprecedented tools with which to command and control 
naval forces. Ironically, it is the Navy’s unprecedented tools that add risk to operating in 
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the littorals. Current command and control networks emit a significant and detectable EM 
signature. The Navy expects adversaries to use emerging electromagnetic spectrum 
(EMS) technologies to detect, identify, and triangulate locations in the littorals (DON, 
2015). As EM tools emerge and are coupled with mines and anti-ship ballistic missiles, 
they create additional anti-access/area denial (A2AD) challenges for the Navy.  
Regardless of the threat, the Navy has a mandate to project power in the littorals, 
which is codified in the Department of the Navy’s (DON) Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower (2015). The DON’s strategy document confirms that: “[n]ew 
challenges in cyberspace and the [EM] spectrum mean [that the Navy] can no longer 
presume to hold the information ‘high ground.’ Opponents seek to deny, disrupt, disable, 
or cause damage to [naval] forces… with advanced networked information systems” 
(DON, 2015, p. 8). In order to respond to rising A2/AD challenges, DON states that the 
Navy will “develop a force capable of effective, autonomous operations in an 
information-denied or -degraded environment” (p. 33, 2015). Operating in information-
degraded environments is not a new naval concept. Key tenets of command and control 
in the maritime domain have long been “the necessity of the subordinate commanders to 
execute operations independently … with a thorough understanding of the commander’s 
intent, and command by negation” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013, p. I-2).  
According to the Navy, no matter how hostile the EM conditions are, elements of 
a modern naval force must share information (DON, 2015). Commanders must receive 
critical information in order to maintain situational awareness and make informed 
decisions (Joint Publication 3-0, 2011). Elements of any naval or joint force need to 
maintain a common operational picture (COP) in order to work together effectively.  
The Navy created its electromagnetic maneuver warfare (EMW) concept to 
achieve EM resilience, attempting to disable the adversary’s A2/AD targeting capabilities 
through the use of cyberspace and the EM spectrum (DON, 2015). However, the Navy 
should not assume that its EMW will succeed when needed and should not continue to 
rely solely on persistent networks. When disabling adversarial targeting capabilities fails, 
the Navy will return to its reliance upon emission control (EMCON) to achieve EM 
resilience (Angevine, 2011). The idea of EMCON is that by disconnecting persistent 
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networks, a naval force reduces the adversary’s ability to detect the presence of and target 
friendly naval forces. However, the surface Navy no longer trains to operate while 
disconnected. The Navy is currently investigating ways to command and control (C2) the 
naval force in any EM hostile environment (DON, 2013). Disruption-based networking 
fits well within the Navy’s search of C2 innovations. 
2. Marine Corps Future Operating Environment 
The impetus for the Marine Corps Operating Concept published in 2016 is the 
Marine Corps’ own recognition that it “is not organized, trained, and equipped to meet 
the demands of a future operating environment characterized by complex terrain, 
technology proliferation, information warfare, the need to shield and exploit signatures, 
and an increasingly non-permissive maritime domain” (USMC, 2016a, p. 12).  
Listed as a critical task, the Marine Corps states that it must:  
exhaust all possibilities to protect our C2 and information networks while 
simultaneously exploiting networking to put ourselves into position to 
gain all the possible advantages thereof. This includes operating with 
ruthless prioritization of information sharing between the various 
command echelons while being prepared to operate with imperfect 
information. We must take into account the role of signature in offense 
and defense to mitigate the enemy’s targeting of our network and exploit 
enemy C2 vulnerabilities. We must shorten the kill chain by networking 
for rapid/precise fires and pushing processing power to the tactical edge. 
(USMC, 2016b, p. 6) 
Marine Corps leadership envisions a future where Marines fight in complex, 
urban areas that “are the most likely to occur and the most dangerous. (2016a, p. 25)” 
Urban terrain is complex, both geographically and in the EM spectrum. Marine Corps 
leadership specifies initiatives in manned-unmanned teaming as well as shortening the 
“kill chain” by closely linking geographically distributed forces with intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) sensors and fires. In a scenario that places those 
distributed teams in hostile EM conditions, the need for alternatives to the persistent 
networking model becomes urgent. Emerging technologies make those hostile EM 
conditions more likely in the future operating environment. 
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3. Maturing Technological Threats 
There are emerging technologies that Navy and Marine Corps leaders believe 
could threaten friendly persistent networks. Two of these threats include the proliferation 
of commercially available EM detection and targeting tools and near-peer adversary 
weapon development. 
a. Targeting Space 
Satellite communication systems have long been a means to broadcast 
information to forces outside of the terrestrial communications infrastructure, which is 
where the DOD frequently operates. Likewise, for a long time, space was seen as a 
sanctuary (Deblois, 1998). That perception began changing in 2007, when China 
successfully destroyed one of their antiquated weather satellites with a SC-19 direct-
ascent weapon (Kan, 2007). According to Lewis in a Foreign Policy magazine article 
(2014), China tested their antisatellite (ASAT) four times. China’s current ability to target 
objects in low earth orbit (LEO) is a clear demonstration that the DOD’s ISR satellite 
networks are threatened. It is only a matter of time before networks using 
geosynchronous earth orbits (GEO) and other orbits are also in jeopardy. The 
implications of losing such persistent communication systems raises many questions. 
How would the DOD command and control its forces without satellite communications? 
b. Geolocation Tools Become Available 
Sayed, Tagrihat, and Khajehnouri (2005) detail how in 1996, the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) mandated that wireless carriers report locations of 
users who place 911 calls using wireless devices. That mandate spurred significant 
enhancements of wireless location algorithms. Sayed et al. also cite other motivations that 
will increase radiodirection technology, most interestingly the function of mobile 
advertising. Mobile advertisers hope to be able to offer companies with the ability to 
generate just-in-time ads. Think of a case where a driver is listening to Internet radio 
when an add plays about a restaurant just up ahead, or the driver approaches a billboard 
which has changed to advertise something that predicts the driver’s needs based on his or 
her browsing history. Patwari et al. (2005) describe measurement-based statistical models 
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that use time-of-arrival (TOA), angle-of-arrival (AOA), and received-signal-strength 
(RSS) that may reappear in geolocation algorithms used in the littoral areas for targeting 
purposes. Drones that carry EM geolocation equipment exist, and according to Gruss 
(2013), the market for more unmanned systems using EM detection and location tools 
exists as well. As EM geolocation tools proliferate, the DOD cannot ignore the 
probability that adversaries of all types will attempt to use them to enhance their targeting 
capabilities. 
B. CURRENT RESEARCH IN NON-PERSISTENT SIGNAL 
COMMUNICATIONS 
The previous section detailed some of the motivations behind disruption-based 
network research. This section provides an overview of research efforts that parallel the 
focus of this thesis. Prior work with data communication networks modeled as clusters 
connected only by disruption, or bursts, is limited. However, there is an interesting line of 
research that focuses on successful transfer of data when the entire path from sender to 
destination cannot be achieved synchronously (Sehl, 2013). There is also a proposal to 
use projectile-based networking nodes as a control channel to provide waypoint 
instructions in tactical mesh networks (Bordetsky and Netzer, 2010). There is also a 
projectile that transmits video images back to the shooter during flight (Rafael, n.d.). 
These research efforts will be addressed individually in the following sections. 
1. Delay and Disruption-Tolerant Networking (DTN) 
Delay and disruption-tolerant networks (DTN) are a relatively new networking 
architecture conceived for environments where an end-to-end path from sender to 
receiver may not be possible. Delay tolerant networks generally refer to networks which 
have to overcome long latency due to distances and availability (Sehl, 2013). Disruption 
tolerant networks, on the other hand, generally refer to a wider range of obstacles to 
overcome. These obstacles include myriad issues such as transmission distances and 
intentional attack (Sehl, 2013). The main driver of DTN research was the interplanetary 
Internet, conceived for use in interplanetary communications and deep space exploration 
(Cerf et al., 2007). The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) did not 
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use an Internet-style architecture to communicate with satellites and spacecraft in the 
past. Instead, NASA has used point-to-point or single relay LEO links to communicate 
with spacecraft (National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA], n.d.). 
However, NASA predicts that future exploration will not be successful using the point-
to-point communication model. As exploration goes deeper into space, point-to-point 
connection opportunities will be of limited duration and latency will hinder successful 
data transfer. NASA believes that overcoming these more complex environments will 
require data transfer between many nodes. NASA believes they need a communication 
model akin to the Internet only in space. However, traditional earth-bound Internet 
functionality seems ill-suited to scale up for the space environment. Figure 1 illustrates 
delay- and disruption-tolerant networking architecture. 
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Figure 1.  Delay- and Disruption-Tolerant Network. Source: Warthman 
(2015).  
The Internet architecture on earth is ill-suited to scale up for the space 
environment because it was and is developed with a few key assumptions that do not hold 
true in the space environment. Cerf et al. (2007) list several of these fundamental 
assumptions in their Delay Tolerant Networking Architecture request for comment 
(RFC). Cerf et al. note the assumptions that: 
 an end-to-end path exists between source and destination for the duration 
of a communication session 
 retransmission based on timely feedback from the receiver is an effective 
method to repairing errors 
 end-to-end loss is relatively small 
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These assumptions led to the development of protocols designed to treat the two 
nodes as a back-and-forth conversation style communication. These protocols range from 
reliable transport of information to encryption for confidentiality. Protocol developers 
optimized functionality for the terrestrial environment. The problem is that in the space 
environment, an end-to-end path may not exist. Orbiting planets and satellites have 
windows in which connections are possible and windows where connections are not. In 
fact, many other underlying assumptions in the Internet also do not hold true in space. 
Space environments also experience long delays due to sheer distances and high error 
rates due to radiation and other factors. Thus, traditional inter-networking protocols used 
in space produce errors, significant delays, poor performance, and failure.  
The general idea of disruption-tolerant networks is that the routers along the path 
from sender to destination use a store-and-forward model instead of a simple route-and-
relay model. The DTN-capable nodes store bundles of data until such a time when 
connection to the next node is possible. When connection with the next node is made, the 
DTN-capable nodes forward their bundles. Think of delay-tolerant networking as the 
pony express model of communications. The pony express comprised a series of stops 
where riders would exchange bundles and carry them to the next stop before going back 
for more. DTN, like the pony express, has a custody exchange feature (Cerf et al., 2007). 
Detailed description of both traditional Internet architecture and the disruption-tolerant 
network architecture is provided in Chapter III.  
Delay/Disruption tolerant networking architecture appears to be quickly maturing. 
DTN was proved as a concept in 2002 and NASA began working with the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in 2004 on the next generation DTN 
(NASA, n.d.). The network working group at Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 
published two RFCs in 2007. NASA deployed the first DTN capability to the 
international space station in 2014. Interestingly, the Delay Tolerant Networking 
Research Group (DTNRG) believes that the DTN architecture will fit naturally in several 
environments other than space. In RFC 4838, the DTNRG specifically recommends DTN 
in sensor-based networks using scheduled intermittent connectivity, satellite networks 
with periodic connectivity windows, underwater acoustic networks, and terrestrial 
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wireless networks that cannot maintain end-to end connectivity (Cerf et al, 2007). The 
DOD has noticed DTN’s potential application in tactical networking as well. Sehl (2013) 
examines a Raytheon-produced DTN software product for suitability for use by the 
United States Marine Corps. DTN fits as a major consideration in this thesis’ proposed 
multi-domain, tactical mesh network communicating by disruption only because of EM 
detection probability. A few of these considerations are detailed in following chapters. 
2. Projectile-Based Nodes 
Bordetsky and Netzer (2010) describe the Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) 
Center for Network Innovation and Experimentation (CENETIX) and mesh network 
projects intended to further the development of interagency collaboration. In their report, 
Bordetsky and Netzer list projectile-based mesh networks as a potential area of 
experimentation. Their idea evolved logically as a potential method to transmit waypoint 
management information in autonomous unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Bordetsky 
further describes a potential role for projectile-based nodes in Patterns of Tactical 
Networks (2012). In describing the future of manned-unmanned teams, Bordetsky 
describes how decentralized computation services, made possible by emerging 
technologies, can reduce the amount of data required to be transmitted to a central 
information system designed to provide both operational decision support and network 
management (2012). According to Bordetsky, “ongoing field experimentation with 
tactical networking environments clearly indicates that disruption-based networking 
could become one of the major trends in the emerging tactical services” (2012, p. 8). 
Bordetsky hypothesizes that tactical sensor networks, unmanned systems, and moving 
operators could combine to negate the typical requirement to maintain wireless 
connections in any network. Bordetsky describes “a disruption-based model of 
networking at high-speed… in which two-way communication takes place during 2–8 
seconds of the grenade type device slowed down descent to the area of interest” (2012, p. 
8). Bordetsky specifically names the Firefly as a prototype for testing such short-burst 
tactical networks (2012). The Firefly is discussed in the next section. 
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3. Rafael Firefly 
Rafael (n.d.) envisioned the Firefly as an enabler for a squad-size unit in an urban 
combat environment. According to Rafael, the Firefly is a 40mm grenade-launched video 
camera, sending imagery back to a tactical unit without the need for line of sight. Rafael 
advertised the Firefly’s key features as streaming video, high-resolution photo, and quiet 
launch. The Firefly’s maximum range is 600m, and maximum apogee is 150m. At 
maximum altitude, the Firefly’s resolution is 20cm per pixel. Although not a two-way 
data communication system, the Firefly is a proof of concept that data can be transferred 
from a small projectile back to the grenade launcher and tablet. Figure 2 shows the 
Firefly and its components: 
 
Figure 2.  Firefly and components. Source: Rafael, (n.d.).  
We attempted to obtain a Firefly, but it was no longer in production by or 
supported from the Rafael Corportation. We thereupon decided to conduct a feasibility 
analysis for prototyping our own using commercially-available electronic components 
and our own 3D-printed assembly designs. 
 15 
C. BURSTY NETWORKS 
This section reviews current network science research for networks that display 
bursty behavior. The volume of previous research in telecommunication networks 
modeled as clusters connected only by disruption, or bursts, is finite. However, bursty 
behavior within various network types is well-studied under the network science field. 
Barabasi is a respected voice in network science, and Barabasi’s work (2010) offers some 
context about naturally occurring short-lived networks that is useful for this study. While 
networks of wealth examples are seemingly unrelated to the study of data communication 
networks, Barabasi’s study finds bursty patterns in systems where randomness would 
initially appear more likely. Barabasi’s findings are of particular interest because they 
offer the possibility that communications over the DOD’s command and control systems 
may also exhibit burstiness, where previously the frequency of those communications 
might have been assumed as random. The possibility that application layer command and 
control data exhibits bursty characteristics would suggest that the projectile and short-
living nodes are actually well-suited for use in tactical networks. The following sections 
detail Barabasi’s contributions to the study of network patterns. Although not tied 
directly into telecommunications, the concepts are relevant and important in the context 
of this study. 
1. Bursty Versus Random Network Patterns 
In Bursts (2010), Barabasi explains that most of the technologies of modern life 
are the result of hundreds of years of scientific inquiry endeavored with the enduring 
belief that, even though they were yet unknown, there are laws that explain natural 
phenomena. Bursts is the chronicle of Barabasi’s pursuit to discover those laws by 
examining human systems for patterns and then developing models to recreate those 
patterns. While Bursts is not specific to data networks, Barabasi’s insights enrich the 
meaning of this study. 
Barabasi (p.85, 2010) begins by pointing out the unexpected patterns produced by 
truly random systems. He offers the common example of a random system: rolling dice. 
Rolling a die is a truly random outcome; the chances of resting on the side facing up is 
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one in six. Barabasi shows a sequence of 400 roles, marking a dot for each roll that 
results in one through five, and a slash for every six that is rolled. Figure 3 shows the 
results of Barabasi’s die roll sequence.  
 
Figure 3.  Die Roll Sequence. Source: Barabasi (2010).  
The sequence appears random but at the same time rather uniform. Most of 
Barabasi’s sixes appear within five to seven rolls of each other. Barabasi points out that 
the die roll system is not likely to go 10 straight rolls each resulting in a six nor would it 
be probable to get a remarkably long string absent of sixes. The system would have to 
roll one hundred million times for that event to occur probabilistically. Barabasi uses the 
example system to demonstrate that truly random systems result in Poisson distributions.  
Barabasi proposes that many human systems also demonstrate patterns following 
the Poisson distribution. Barabasi (pp. 98–102, 2010) cites Richardson’s Statistics of 
Deadly Quarrels (1950) as a direct example. Richardson catalogues conflicts and wars 
that occurred between 1820 and 1949 in an attempt to find causal factors. Barabasi notes 
that Richardson found no causal factors in the data: they appeared random. According to 
Poisson, if wars are truly random then they should each have roughly the same number of 
casualties. However, the amount of casualties varied greatly. Richardson assigned a base 
10 logarithmic scale according to the amount of deaths in each war, giving a magnitude 
zero value to conflicts with few casualties and a magnitude seven value to the wars that 
took millions of lives. Barabasi describes Richardson’s findings as “the fewer, the larger” 
(p. 102). World Wars I and II are the lone magnitude sevens, while 188 of the 282 other 
wars were of magnitude three or less. Barabasi also cites the more famous economist 
Pareto and Pareto’s work in networks of wealth. Pareto discovered that while the vast 
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majority of people are poor, a select few garner vast wealth (p. 102, 2010). Pareto’s work 
became known as Pareto’s law, where in many systems 20% of the independent variables 
collect 80% of the dependent variables. 
Barabasi also studies the pattern of email traffic, first citing personal email data 
and then using a larger data set provided by Eckman (pp. 101–103, 2010). Interestingly, 
Barabasi notes that 80% of email is sent in 20% of the time. Email networks follow the 
Pareto law. Plotted against time, emails are absent altogether for long periods of time, 
then are sent in bursts. Barabasi finds that phone calls are made in bursts too. Barabasi’s 
opinion is that the reason email burstiness fascinates is “precisely because it is not unique 
to our email pattern” (p. 104).  
Barabasi’s perception of ubiquitous burstiness begs questions whether those 
patterns carry over to the military: might command and control communications in a 
tactical force also exhibit burstiness? There are some initial hints that the prospect is a 
worthy inquiry. It is a common observation by many who have been in combat recalling 
long periods of inactivity followed by short periods of frantic action. If command and 
control communications during missions prove to exhibit bursty patterns, might a bursty 
network—one that exists only by disruption—adequately support command and control 
requirements?  
Since bursty tactical networks are only theoretical, the first step to address these 
questions is to prove that networking in such a way is possible. This thesis is designed as 
a proof of concept, prototyping projectile-based nodes and experimenting with their use. 
Selecting the components of the projectile-based node and understanding of the network 
behavior in our experiments requires technical understanding of data communication 
network technologies and protocols. The next chapter provides this technical background. 
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III. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 
This chapter provides the technical background of the thesis. The technical 
background is provided as three main reference frameworks. The first section outlines the 
open systems interconnect (OSI) framework. This study considers each layer in the OSI 
model while examining network and EM signature behavior. The second section contains 
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) framework model. The CIA model 
provides relevant considerations for the desired behavior of tactical networks. The final 
section provides the reader with a background in systems-theory. This study is designed 
using systems theory and uses systems theory as a lens through which to observe network 
behavior. And finally, the third section provides a framework for the reader to understand 
the technologies and protocols that this study observes in order to explain node and 
network behavior during the experiments. The third section will assist the reader in 
understanding our findings and recommendations.  
A. OPEN SYSTEMS INTERCONNECT (OSI) MODEL 
This section discusses the OSI model in layman’s terms. Readers who are familiar 
with these frameworks should skip this section.  
At the most basic level, all communication involves an entity that sends 
information and an entity that receives it (Comer, 2015). Comer states that those two 
entities must agree on several things for communication to be possible. The range and 
number of these agreements may not seem obvious. To illustrate a few of the necessary 
agreements, consider an example of when one person, Alice, wishes to communicate with 
another person, Bob. Alice typically makes a choice to use voice, making the assumption 
that Bob will be both able to hear her and also understand her language. Alice first 
detects that Bob is not otherwise engaged, and begins by saying “Hello, Bob” or by 
making good eye contact. If Alice interrupts Bob’s existing conversation, she would be 
breaking etiquette and her interruption would likely interfere with the existing 
conversation. If Alice began the conversation without ensuring Bob knows that Alice is 
talking to him, Bob would probably miss some information and Alice would have to start 
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over. Beginning conversations without interruption, gaining attention, and beginning with 
‘hello’ are all agreements that the reader may more easily recognize as etiquette. If Alice 
is writing, she uses commas and periods to frame her thoughts and to indicate to Bob that 
pausing is necessary. Bob would find it difficult to follow Alice’s writing if she omits 
those natural breaks. Data also has breaks, characterized at the most basic level as frames. 
In data communications, these etiquette agreements are called protocols. A protocol is 
simply a set of steps that need to be followed. These agreements, whether etiquette or 
protocol, are designed to ensure successful communications. These agreements are also 
of varying degrees of complexity. The OSI model provides a common frame of reference 
for agreements of different complexity. The OSI model divides protocols by the function 
they perform (Comer, 2015). The OSI model is an essential frame of reference for this 
study. Specifically, this study seeks to understand how the protocols in the experiments 
affect network behavior. Through this analysis, this study provides insight about 
favorable characteristics of protocols resident in nodes within a disruption-based 
network.  
The OSI model’s divisions are commonly called ‘layers’ and each layer is 
‘stacked’ by the sophistication of the function that the layer performs. The OSI model has 
seven layers as depicted in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.  OSI 7-Layer Communication Model. Source: Comer (2015).  
 The layered approach allows for developing new ways to perform a specific 
function without requiring developers to modify each of the other functions as well. A 
full technical description of the OSI model is in the organization for international 
standardization (ISO)/IEC 7498–1 (1996). The following sections address the each of the 
seven layers and provide common examples in both fixed and mobile network types.  
1. Physical Layer 
The physical layer is the lowest logical division in the OSI stack and deals 
primarily with the mediums themselves, which are classified as guided or unguided. 
Examples of physical layer mediums include Ethernet cable and IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi). 
Physical layer properties are important in this study. Functions at all higher layers are 
translated into a physical layer signal. Adversary detection of the physical layer’s signal 
is a driving force to study alternative networking methods and is a significant 
consideration throughout this experimentation with disruption-based networking. 
This research uses unguided, or wireless, mediums. Wireless mediums are 
suitable in tactical networks where nodes are mobile. Agreements made at the physical 
layer are agreements about the physical properties of the signals themselves. Any two 
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nodes must agree on the medium used, the bandwidth (defined simply as the highest 
frequency to the lowest frequency), and the data encoding technique.  
Data encoding is performed by modulation in analog carriers and by shift keying 
in digital signals (Comer, 2015). Common modulation techniques include amplitude 
modulation and frequency modulation (Comer, 2015). A signal using amplitude 
modulation keeps the frequency constant while varying the amplitude according to the 
data being carried. A signal using frequency modulation keeps the amplitude constant 
while varying the frequency. Figure 5 illustrates a carrier wave with amplitude 
modulation on the left and frequency modulation on the right. 
 
Figure 5.  Illustration of Modulation. Source: Comer (2015).  
When compared with analog modulation, shift keying techniques allow more discrete 
values and subsequently more data encoded. A phase shift interrupts the sinusoidal wave 
to encode data. Data encoding techniques affect the amount of data that is transmitted in a 
given time. Figure 6 shows amplitude shift keying.  
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Figure 6.  Illustration of Amplitude Shift Keying. Source: Comer (2015).  
The importance of data encoding techniques is in their trade-offs with acceptable 
error rates in a given environment. A signal that uses a more sophisticated data encoding 
technique will transfer more data than a signal with a lesser sophisticated technique, 
given that both signals are in the same environment. However, the more sophisticated 
signal will also be prone to experience more bit errors. 
Antenna types and signal strength are physical layer concerns. The type of 
antenna used influences the EM pattern emitted. Omni-directional antennas commonly 
emit a pattern that resembles a donut, while directional antennas emit a pattern that looks 
similar to an uninflated balloon. Power and emission pattern drive signal range in the 
wireless environment. Signal range is a key variable in creating a connection between any 
two nodes. Signal range is also a key variable in electromagnetic geolocation. In a 
military context, an adversary with a receiver will be unable to detect a friendly signal if 
the signal is indiscernible from the background noise. The transmitter’s emission pattern 
and signal power are therefore major factors in detection. 
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Physical layer configurations have interactive relationships. Signal strength 
compared to noise level is directly related to power and antenna type. Bit errors 
commonly occur due to insufficient signal to noise ratio (SNR) and interference. Physical 
layer modulation techniques are selected to balance the desired throughput with an 
acceptable bit error rate in the given environment. However, detecting bit errors is a 
function of the next layer which is discussed in the following section. 
2. Data Link Layer 
The data link layer is also referred to as “layer 2” or as the media access control 
(MAC) layer. Agreements at layer 2 include addressing, maximum frame size supported, 
and how the medium is shared between users. It is useful to consider again Alice and 
Bob’s conversation at the beginning of this section in order to understand layer 2 
functionality.  
Addressing includes unicast, multicast, and broadcast. To understand unicast, 
think of Alice walking into a crowded and loudly saying, “Bob.” Everyone not named 
Bob easily dismisses Alice. Multicast equates to a scenario where Alice says, “Bob, 
Charlie, and Dick,…” or if she said, “Team 1,….” Anyone not named Bob, Charlie, or 
Dick would dismiss Alice’s call for attention. Likewise, layer 2 broadcasting is similar to 
Alice saying, “Hello everyone.” The addressing function within later 2 is handled by the 
logical link control (LLC) sublayer.  
Maximum transmission size for the network is also understandable using Alice’s 
conversation. Alice frames her sentences using commas, periods, and inflection. Without 
that framing, her conversation would be difficult to understand. Similarly, data is divided 
into frames at layer 2. The maximum segment size (MSS) dictates how many bytes are 
transmitted within a frame on the network in question.  
The other major agreement addressed at layer 2 is the manner in which many 
nodes share the same medium.  
Imagine if Alice was trying to communicate with Bob from across a crowded 
room. A common technique would be for Alice and Bob to move closer to one another so 
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they can hear each other better and will not disrupt—or be disrupted by—other people. 
The same function needs to occur in data communications. However, two computers 
often are unable to change their physical proximity to one another. Subsequently, the 
media access control (MAC) sublayer protocols are designed to avoid, detect, and resolve 
transmission collisions in wireless networks (Comer, 2015).  
There are a few common techniques to allow shared access of the wireless 
bandwidth that are worth discussing in this section. These techniques can be categorized 
by the manner in which the medium is distributed, or allocated, between nodes. The 
shared models include controlled access, random access, and channelized protocols 
(Comer, 2015). Random access protocols use the idea of competition to determine access 
to channels. Random access protocols resolve collisions by retransmission (Comer, 
2015). Conversely, channelization protocols allocate to nodes a portion of the total 
resource. The resource is generally frequency and time. Channelization protocols 
generally need greater awareness of all nodes in order to distribute the resources 
appropriately. The reservation category allows nodes to share the common resource by 
employing a central controller to reserve spots, poll for traffic, or without a central 
controller by token passing. Comer (2015) provides an illustration of the taxonomy of 
media access protocols in Figure 7. There are a few random access protocols and 




Figure 7.  Taxonomy of Media Access Protocols. Source: Comer (2015).  
The important channelization protocols include frequency division multiplexing 
(FDM) and time division multiplexing (TDM). FDM separates nodes by frequency so 
that communications do not interfere with each other. FDM is illustrated in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8.  Illustration of Frequency Division Multiplexing. Source: 
Comer (2015).  
 27 
Major trade-offs in using FDM is that channels that are unused by the users assigned to 
them may not be used to provide more bandwidth to users with a greater need than their 
channel provides. Another technique is to divide the medium by time and give nodes 
different time slots. This technique is called time division multiplexing (TDM). TDM is 
illustrated in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9.  Illustration of Time Division Multiplexing. Source: Comer 
(2015).  
A major trade-off for TDM is the necessary time and effort required to synchronize all 
nodes and distribute the time slots.  
 The random access protocols that are important to this study are the Carrier 
Sensing Multiple Access (CSMA) protocols. The carrier sensing part of CSMA means 
that the nodes in the network begin by listening for a contending signal so that they do 
not interfere with ongoing communication (Comer, 2015). This interference avoidance is 
how the protocol achieves multiple access of the medium. Although all nodes listen first, 
collisions can occur when two or more nodes need to communicate and they begin to 
transmit at the same time. CSMA protocols resolve collisions by either Collision 
Avoidance (CA) or Collision Detection (CD). CSMA-CD is prevalent in wired networks. 
CSMA-CA is common in mesh networking applications. CSMA-CD performs sub-
optimally in wireless applications because of some unique characteristics with wireless 
signals. There are several common problems in wireless networking that do not exist in 
wired applications. The first is the hidden terminal problem (Comer, 2015), as illustrated 
in Figure 10.  
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Figure 10.  Hidden Station. Adapted from Comer (2015).  
As illustrated in Figure 10, computer 1 is in range of computer 2 but will not detect a 
signal emitted from computer 3. Computer 2 can reach both computers 1 and 3, but 
computer 3 is out of range to detect a signal from computer 1. With computers 1 and 3 
unable to detect signals from each other, both their signals will collide at computer 2. 
Another nuance in the wireless applications is the exposed station problem. Consider 
Figure 11. Computer 2 needs to communicate with computer 1 while computer 3 needs to 
communicate with computer 4. If computer 2 starts first, computer 3 will be unable to 
begin communicating with computer 4 because it senses that it is exposed to the signal 
emitted from computer 2. 
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Figure 11.  Exposed Station Problem. Adapted from Comer (2015).  
The CSMA-CA protocol is designed to help overcome the problems associated with 
wireless applications by sending ready to send (RTS), clear to send (CTS) and 
acknowledgement (ACK) messages. CSMA-CA is illustrated in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12.  Illustration of CSMA—CD. Source: Comer (2015).  
Comer’s illustration omits the ACK message of CSMA. In practice, after computer 3 
transmits the packet to computer 2, computer 3 would listen for an ACK from computer 
2. Receiving no ACK indicates to computer 3 that a collision occurred. Computer 3 
would then wait a certain amount of time, and begin again with an RTS message. 
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The discussed MAC layer protocols are important to this study because they are 
included in the nodes of the projectiles we prototype and their behavior impacts the type, 
quantity, and timing of the signals emitted at the physical layer. Layer 2 protocols also 
impact network behavior in terms of data throughput and latency. For example, if a 
tactical network requires high throughput, or if there are a lot of nodes within the 
network, the MAC layer protocols that provide efficient resource-sharing are going to 
emit a detectable signal while negotiating the resource. Thus, resource negotiations are 
significant in a tactical scenario because they add to the time that the detectable signal 
exists which increases the possibility of detection by an adversary. Protocols at even 
higher layers also add to that time. Layer 3 is discussed in the next section. 
3. Network Layer 
The next layer in the OSI architecture is called the network interface layer, 
Internet layer, or simply layer three (Comer, 2015). The network interface layer exists 
primarily to interconnect networks. To demonstrate using the Alice and Bob example, 
suppose that Alice knew that Bob was in a group far away, and that she needed to use 
other groups in between them to deliver a letter to him. Alice needs more than his name. 
Alice needs an address for Bob and she needs a network capable of transporting the letter 
to him. The network needs to agree on how to route the letter and then perform routing 
services. Routing agreements are made at the network interface layer in data 
communication networks. This section outlines a few relevant network layer protocols in 
general terms, provides a few examples popular in mesh networks, and then describes 
their effect on the physical layer. 
The most widely recognized implementation of the network layer addressing 
protocols is the Internet protocol (IP). IP version 4 (IPv4) addresses is detailed in 
International Engineering Task Force (IETF) publication RFC 791 (1981). According to 
RFC 791, IP is specifically limited to provide the functions required to deliver a package 
of bits, called a datagram. Mechanisms to assist in data reliability, flow control, and 
sequencing are found in higher levels. Those required limited functions include 
addressing and fragmentation, which occurs when the data sent is larger than the 
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allowable datagram size (IETF, 1981). Refer to RFC 791 for more detail about IPv4 and 
RFC 2460 for detail of IP version 6 (IPv6). 
Protocols that use IP addresses to perform routing are typically designed to 
achieve maximum throughput. Mesh networks can be broadly categorized by whether 
they proactively or reactively conduct route discovery and route maintenance (Wang, Xie 
& Agrawal, 2009). Proactive routing protocols maintain routes for nodes, exchange route 
and link information between nodes, and have overhead associated with that proactive 
agreement-making (Wang et al., 2009). That overhead is work that must be done outside 
of the actual data that users need to send. That overhead also goes through layer 2 down 
to the physical layer and becomes a detectable signal. Reactive routing protocols discover 
communication paths only when communication is required by a node. In reactive 
models, discovered network paths are maintained only during transmission and reception, 
and quickly expire afterwards. Reactive routing typically requires less overhead when 
compared to proactive routing models (Wang, Xie & Agrawal, 2009). The trade-off for 
less overhead often manifests in time delay between sending and arrival at the message’s 
ultimate destination. This delay also means that the physical signal is present and 
detectable while the route is discovered. Tactically, the more time that the physical signal 
is detectable, the more likely it is that an adversary with geolocation capability will 
successfully target friendly forces. 
The most popular proactive routing protocol in mesh networking is optimized link 
state routing (OLSR). Networks using OLSR exchange network topology information 
proactively by nodes exchanging messages with the state of their links. OLSR-equipped 
nodes first exchange ‘hello’ messages in order to discover their neighbors. Nodes then 
exchange link state messages to share their routes in order to be ready to quickly route 
data from the application layer. OLSR version 1 is detailed in RFC 3626 and OLSR 
version 2 is detailed in RFC 7181. We omit detail of OLSR in this section because the 
proactive exchange of network topology at layer 3 in our proposed disruption-based, 
bursty, network is unsupportable.  
The most popular reactive routing protocol in mesh networking is ad hoc on-
demand distance vector (AODV). AODV is detailed in RFC 3561. Networks using 
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AODV discover the route to link two nodes only after one of the nodes has application-
layer data to transmit. The route between the nodes is discovered through a series of route 
requests (RREQ) and route replies (RREP). Once the route is determined, each node 
along the route transmits hello messages at short intervals to ensure that the route is 
active. Any node that does not receive either traffic from the sender to the destination or 
the frequent hello messages over a given amount of time will transmit a route error 
(RERR) message. The RERR is then promulgated across the route to let all nodes know 
that the route is broken. The two nodes that are communicating may then determine that 
another route is required and would again submit a RREQ. When compared to OLSR, the 
reactive AODV protocol conducts route discovery when application layer traffic is ready 
to be sent. OLSR conducts route discovery continuously. In light of the physical signals 
emitted by a network at layer 3, the reactive protocols for route discovery are preferred 
for disruption-based networks. 
4. Transport Layer 
The transport layer is the fourth layer and it resides above the routing layer in the 
OSI stack. To understand what the transport layer does, it is necessary to consider that a 
single computer can have many programs running at the same time. While the physical, 
MAC, and routing layers are designed to get data from the sending computer to the 
receiving computer, the computers need the transport layer to identify for which program 
the data is intended. The transport layer uses port assignment to identify the target 
program. Thinking of the MAC as the recipient’s name and the IP as their street address, 
think of the port as the apartment number at that street address. The port is like the 
apartment where the program resides.  
The transport layer does more than just identify ports. It also indicates how the 
message should be handled. There are two common methods of message handling. The 
two common methods deal with whether delivery confirmation is required or not. Think 
of reliable delivery as a signature service for post mail. When the sender requires 
signature service, the receiver is asked to confirm receipt. If a package is lost, the sender 
knows that they must send another. In data communications, most application layer data 
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must be broken into many small packages. Transport control protocol (TCP) is the name 
of the reliable delivery service. TCP is designed for the receiver to acknowledge (ACK) 
receipt. TCP establishes what is called a session. Sessions begin with a synchronize 
(SYN) request from the sender to the receiver. The receiver acknowledges the SYN 
request with a SYN ACK. The sender then acknowledges the SYN ACK with an ACK. 
This SYN, SYN ACK, ACK process is called a three-way handshake. TCP also controls 
flow so that the data communications do not exceed transportation capacity or the 
receiver’s ability to receive. In data communications this function is called avoiding 
congestion. TCP does congestion avoidance by manipulating the number of data 
packages, called segments, sent in between acknowledgements from the receiver. TCP 
starts with a small number of segments. The small number is called a window. The 
window size adjustment process is called sliding window. When the window of segments 
arrives at the receiver, the receiver sends back an ACK containing the next segment 
number it expects to be received from the sender. This ACK message is called the 
predictive ACK. The sender then begins to increase the number of segments as long as 
predictive ACKs are received. When ACKs are not received in a timely fashion, TCP 
dramatically backs off the number of segments. When ACKs are received again, TCP 
begins to increase the number of segments again. This description is a generalization. 
TCP is detailed in RFC 1180 (Socolofsky & Kale, 1991). 
The other common transport layer protocol is user datagram protocol (UDP). 
Unlike TCP, UDP does not ensure reliable delivery and it does not establish a session. 
UDP is desirable when the sender is not concerned if a package of data (called a 
datagram in UDP) gets lost along the route. The sender may know that if a few datagrams 
are lost, more are shortly to follow. UDP messages are common in applications that are 
streaming data consistently and in messages that are transmitted frequently at each layer 
of the OSI stack. UDP is ideal for streaming voice and video applications because the 
receiver will not notice that a frame is lost. UDP avoids the management messages 
associated with TCP, knowing that users will already be aware of a bad connection and 
will be likely to adjust the connection on their own. Users may ask each other to repeat 
what was lost or came in garbled. UDP is also useful in the frequent messages that occur 
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in order to operate the OSI stack. A few examples of these management messages were 
mentioned in proactive and reactive routing protocols in mesh and mobile ad hoc 
networks.  
Although TCP and UDP are the most common protocols at layer 4, they are not 
well-suited for all environments. As mentioned in Chapter II, NASA and other 
organizations are developing delay and disruption-tolerant networking (DTN). In delay 
and disruption-prone networking environments, both TCP and UDP are challenged to 
support the application-layer traffic. TCP, as previously discussed, is based on the idea of 
a two-way communication session. In disruption-prone environment, an end-to-end 
connection may not be possible. When the end-to-end connection is possible between 
sender and receiver, TCP relies upon timely ACKs from the receiver. Without the timely 
ACK, the sender will keep the number of segments small and will resend them again and 
again until an ACK is received. TCP, therefore, is sub-optimal for delay and disruption-
prone environments. UDP does not fare much better. Like TCP, UDP was designed for 
end-to-end communication. When the nodes at origin and destination cannot maintain an 
end-to-end connection, UDP message simply times out at the intermediate routers. In 
such a case, the sender might continue for some time before realizing that no one is 
receiving. The DTN protocol is designed as an overlay on the transport layer. Each node 
along the route uses TCP to store segments, called bundles, from the downstream node 
and then forwards the bundles to the upstream node when the connection with that node 
is possible. Like TCP, DTN provides some acknowledgement that the message was 
received. The DTN protocol goes a step further, adding a custody transfer option between 
the DTN-enabled nodes along the route (Cerf et al., 2007). With custody transfer enabled, 
DTN-enabled nodes send custody confirmation messages back to the origin when the 
bundles are successfully transferred along the route. 
5. Presentation and Session Layers 
The presentation and session layers in the reference model are not widely used in 
practice (Comer, 2015). Layers 5 and 6 were added as network management functions for 
telecommunications providers. Without widespread inclusion, presentation and session 
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layers do not factor in to this study. They are mentioned here for the sake of 
completeness. 
6. Application Layer 
The application layer is offers the most variety of protocols. These protocols are 
typically specific to the type of application. Application layer protocols are often 
proprietary and are developed during the programming and development process. The 
application layer is the layer with which the user—if there is a user—interfaces. Likely 
the other layers, the application layer directly impacts the time that nodes emit physical 
signals. The way that a specific application is designed affects the network behavior. For 
instance, an application that seeks updated information at regular intervals automatically 
for the user will cause network traffic and physical signal emission. In tactical networks, 
the users may not be aware that the traffic is occurring. Without the ability to exercise 
discipline of their emissions, friendly forces are unable to manage their risks. 
There is a specific schema offered at the application layer that has impacted mesh 
networking and command and control efforts. The protocol is called cursor on target 
(CoT). Developed at the Mitre Corporation, CoT is link-agnostic (Cursor On Target 
Office, 2013). CoT data is link-agnostic because it can be transmitted between systems 
that use different network architectures. CoT messages are formatted as basic extensible 
markup language (XML) language. CoT messages contain the basic data elements “what, 
when, and where” that can be used for a variety of services (Kristan, Hamalainen, 
Robbins, & Newell, 2009). CoT data is commonly used to populate common operating 
system (COP) systems on a map. Important to this study, CoT data can also be used to 
optimize message routing (Bordetsky and Netzer, 2010). In concept, the COP system 
map view could also be used to inform the routing function in a mesh network. In lieu of 
transmitting frequent ink state information across all nodes for manual computation of 
available links, the same nodes could build a map by using CoT data traversing the 
network and to predict which routes might be available to their intended recipient. The 
CoT-enabled nodes would then test the route with messages before transmitting data. 
Using the application layer CoT messages has the potential to reduce the number of 
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messages required at the routing layer. The CoT schema therefore fits nicely as a 
consideration in bursty networking. It offers a possible method to reduce the number of 
administrative transmissions while determining a given route, which reduces the number 
of opportunities that an adversary is given to detect and target friendly forces. 
B. CONFIDENTIALITY, INTEGRITY, AND AVAILABILITY (CIA) TRIAD 
The CIA triad is popular conceptual framework in computer and network security 
communities. This study uses the CIA triad to inform experiment observations and 
inform desirable qualities in future disruption-based nodes. Confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability are well-defined in the Federal Information Security Management Act 
(FISMA) of 2002. FISMA is legislation that “defines a comprehensive framework to 
protect government information, operations and assets against natural or man-made 
threats” (2002). FISMA provides the confidentiality, integrity, and availability as the end 
goal of information security. FISMA states that information security means “protecting 
information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, 
disruption, modification, or destruction [of information]” (2002). This section first 
defines confidentiality, integrity, and availability, then describes the interesting 
relationships between the elements of the triad, and concludes by providing some 
common network security management practices with the intention of giving unfamiliar 
readers enough background to understand the study’s observations and recommendations. 
1. Definitions 
NIST special publication (SP) 800–33 defines confidentiality as “the requirement 
that private or confidential information not be disclosed to unauthorized individuals. 
Confidentiality protection applies to data in storage, during processing, and while in transit” 
(Stoneburner, 2001). Confidentiality means keeping information away from those without 
authority to access it. The goal of confidentiality, as considered in this study, is that an 
adversary is not able to detect, intercept, and understand the information. 
FISMA defines integrity as the “means guarding against improper information 
modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information nonrepudiation and 
authenticity” (2002). This is a broad definition that includes many things that are worthy 
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of discussion. Most generally, integrity means ensuring the information is received 
without being modified, whether intentionally or unintentionally. Intentional modification 
by an adversary is extremely dangerous. Imagine a call for fire on a certain grid 
coordinate. An enemy that can alter those grid coordinates could trigger events with dire 
outcomes. Unintentional modification is also dangerous. In wireless communications, 
interference and fading can cause data corruption. In the same call for fire example, 
undetected unintentional modification can produce the same dire outcomes. FISMA also 
includes authenticity as a sub-part of integrity. Authenticity means that the information 
definitely came from the sender. Tailored this study’s use, authenticity also means that 
the sender is a known and trusted part of the friendly force. Interestingly, authenticity 
also means that the message is not being received a second or third time. This message 
repetition is called replay. In the example call for fire example, replay is also very 
dangerous. Imagine a replayed call for fire message requesting ordnance on a location 
that friendly forces have moved into since the original call. Finally, non-repudiation 
means that the intended receiver is unable to deny having received the information.  
Availability is the third element of the CIA triad. FISMA defines availability as 
“ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information” (2002). Availability 
means that forces can access, send, and receive information. An adversary may be able to 
deny access to information through direct actions like jamming frequency at which data 
is being transmitted or through indirect actions such as maintaining a significant threat of 
geolocation and targeting.  
2. Relationships 
Confidentiality, integrity, and availability have interdependencies that are 
important. Their relationship is best illustrated through a brief discussion of them as the 
triad. Although different organizations may prioritize one element over the other two, 
achieving all three is the information security goal. Over-prioritization can have a 
negative effect. For example, striving for perfect confidentiality, data and system 
integrity may naturally limit availability for the users that the network is designed to 
service. From a threat point of view, factors that impact one goal will likely significantly 
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impact the other two as well. According to NIST SP 800–33, “[c]onfidentiality is 
dependent on [i]ntegrity, in that if the integrity of the system is lost, then there is no longer a 
reasonable expectation that the confidentiality mechanisms are still valid” (2001). Likewise, 
if confidentiality is lost, there is a high chance that integrity is also jeopardized. When 
availability is lost, there exists a great risk that confidentiality is lost. If availability was lost 
through a denial of service or jamming, the adversary likely knows that friendly 
communications are occurring, which is a ding on confidentiality. 
The relationship between confidentiality, integrity, and availability is important in 
this study. Maintaining confidentiality is a major motivation for designing a network 
established only through burst. Short-living and highly mobile nodes are naturally more 
challenging for an adversary to discover than stationary and persistent nodes. Losing 
confidentiality may mean the adversary will be able to target the force. Ensuring system and 
information integrity is necessary for successful command and control communications. 
Commanders and their forces must be able to trust that their information is authentic. They 
must know that the information is received by their intended recipient and they should 
communicate in such a way that the recipient cannot deny receiving the information. 
Achieving availability is also a significant challenge if the nodes are short-living and highly 
mobile. This study is designed as a proof of concept that availability can be achieved using 
projectile-based network nodes. The CIA triad thus provides a great framework for 
evaluating the experiments in this study. The CIA triad as a framework also helps us draw 
recommendations for future prototypes and desirable qualities in short-living nodes. 
3. Security Mechanisms to Achieve the CIA Triad 
This section provides a high-level discussion of some of the security mechanisms 
in place to achieve confidentiality and integrity in persistent networks. Because bursty 
networking breaks some of the underlying assumptions built into the security 
mechanisms, understanding both the security mechanisms and their underlying principles 
is extremely important in this study. The same broken assumptions previously discussed 
in the OSI-model section are broken assumptions in the security mechanisms put in place 
to achieve confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Specifically, security mechanisms 
that rely on a persistent end-to-end are likely to perform sub-optimally in bursty 
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networks. The next several paragraphs will succinctly discuss symmetric/asymmetric key 
encryption, and the Diffie-Helman key exchange. Each paragraph provides an overview 
and some considerations that pertain to this study. 
Symmetric/asymmetric key encryption, the Diffie-Helman key exchange, and 
message authentication codes all use cryptography. Cryptography uses mathematical 
properties to transform data. It is the basis of encryption and decryption. Cryptography 
also serves as the means with which data is checked for modifications, detect replays, and 
authenticate the sender. According to NIST SP 800–177B, cryptography is the underlying 
mechanism that most technologies use to provide confidentiality, confirm data integrity, 
and authenticate the data’s source, and also to support non-repudiation (Barker, 2016). 
NIST SP 800–177B provides a more detailed discussion of the following section.  
Technologies that employ symmetric key cryptography use the same key to 
encrypt and decrypt data. In general, symmetric key cryptography means that any two 
communicating entities must both share the secret key and keep it secret. Symmetric key 
encryption is faster than asymmetric key encryption (Barker, 2016). However, symmetric 
key cryptography suffers the well-known key distribution problem. For any two users in a 
group to communicate confidentially, each user must have share a unique key. The 
number of keys required grows exponentially as the number of users in the group grows. 
Providing unique keys to all users is a challenge. In a different implementation, if all 
users share the same key and the key is compromised, distributing a new key to all users 
while maintaining the secret is not easy and may take an unacceptable amount of time. 
Further, shared symmetric key use does not support non-repudiation.  
The alternative to symmetric key cryptography is asymmetric key cryptography. 
Asymmetric cryptography uses a public key and private key for each user. The public key 
and private key are mathematically related and the mathematical relationship allows the 
user to decrypt with the private key. The public key is not held as a secret, but is available 
to all users. Using the Alice and Bob example, Alice can encrypt a message with Bob’s 
public key but the message cannot be decrypted with the public key. The message can 
only be decrypted with the Bob’s private key. Using asymmetric key cryptography 
reduces the total keys required to two times the number of users in the group. 
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Asymmetric key cryptography thus reduces the key distribution problem. However, 
asymmetric key cryptography takes greater computational resources and time (Barker, 
2016). There are also hybrid approaches that seek to use the speed of symmetric key 
cryptography with the reduced number of keys needed in the asymmetric cryptography 
model. Commonly, asymmetric keys are used to support authentication, achieve integrity, 
and to generate, agree upon, or transport symmetric keys. These newly established or 
transported symmetric keys are then used to encrypt and decrypt large amounts of data.  
The Diffie-Helman key exchange is a widely used hybrid approach for symmetric 
key generation between two users (Subramanian, 2010). The goal of generating 
symmetric keys is to create a fast way of encrypting and decrypting data while ensuring 
that no one analyzing the data afterwards can compromise confidentiality because the key 
was not saved by either user and the key never transmitted between them. The Diffie-
Helman algorithm uses the same type of mathematical properties as public/private key 
encryption and decryption. The details of how the Diffie-Helman algorithm works are 
less important than the underlying assumption that must be true for the exchange to 
successfully generate a shared secret key. The underlying assumption is the session idea, 
which relies on a persistent end-to-end connection. In this study of short-living, highly 
mobile nodes in a network, such a session may not be possible. If an end-to-end 
connection is possible, the time needed to generate a shared secret key adds to the total 
time that the nodes in the bursty network must emit a detectable signal. The Diffie-
Helman exchange forms the basis for many popular technologies designed to achieve 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. These popular technologies include secure 
socket layer (SSL), top layer security (TLS), Internet Protocol Security (IPSEC), and 
Internet Key Exchange (IKE) (Frankel, Kent, Lewkowski, Orebaugh, Ritchey, & Sharma, 
2005). 
This section reviewed the CIA triad as a reference model for the experiment 
observations and conclusions. The next section discusses the systems theory framework, 
which informs the design of the experiments as well as the context in which observations 
are made. 
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C. SYSTEMS THEORY FRAMEWORK 
Systems theory provides an adequate framework for the conduct of the 
experiments in this study. Systems theory informs the design, the type of data the study 
collects, and the context in which observations are made. This section defines key 
systems thinking concepts including contextual knowledge, feedback, and adaptation, 
which will be central to experimenting with disruption-based networks. It provides a high 
level overview of several influences that are prompting research in communicating over 
networks that are fundamentally different. It also examines previous work in the field of 
networks that are temporary in time and space.  
1. The Systems Thinking Lens: From Objects to Relationships 
Capra (1996) provides a contextual lens through which to consider the 
observations and findings of this study. In The Web of Life, Capra asserts that all of life is 
composed of systems. Capra uses the terms networks and systems interchangeably, as will 
this study. Capra notes that systems can overlap each other and that networks are found 
within systems and networks. To demonstrate, Capra shows that organs are systems 
themselves within organisms, and organisms are in fact systems within ecosystems. 
Using a wolf as an example, lungs are an aspiration system within the animal, feeding 
oxygen into the circulation system that feeds the wolf’s tissues. The wolf’s brain drives 
the lung system and the circulatory system, while also depending on them. All systems 
within the wolf depend on each other while also existing because of one another.  
A key concept in systems thinking is that properties emerge from the working 
system or network that cannot be found in any of the system’s parts (Capra, p.37, 1996). 
Applying the same concept to the wolf analogy, the wolf’s predatory tendencies and its 
howl cannot be found in the lung or the brain. Rather, only as a complete system does the 
wolf exhibit any telltale characteristics. Systems also have a hierarchy, or levels, at work 
within systems (Capra, p.37, 1996). The wolf does not survive without its pack, which is 
the next higher level within its ecosystem. Pack behavior emerges from the 
interdependence and relationships between members, just as ecosystem behavior emerges 
from the interdependent relations of each of its elements. Capra’s point (1996) is that in 
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any system, pack behavior cannot be found by examining a single wolf. In systems 
thinking, the pattern of the whole is what must be considered (Capra, p. 37, 1996). 
Examination of any of the parts will prove to be an inadequate endeavor when attempting 
to derive overall system properties. Phrased another way by Senge (2006), “dividing an 
elephant in half does not produce two small elephants.” Systems thinking suggests that 
studying relationships of a system’s parts, and studying patterns of a network, provide the 
value in understanding the behavior of any network. 
While easily understood in Capra’s “organs within the organism” analogy, the 
emergent property concept should be understood within a military network context in 
order to follow the course of this study. In a military context the warfighter, like a wolf, is 
a system within a system. At a basic level, the warfighter can be viewed as an 
interdependent set of systems, all relying upon training, to exhibit combat prowess. The 
warfighter is likewise a part of a hierarchy of superimposed systems: teams, units, 
commands, and forces. Applied to the military context, Capra’s emergent property 
concept explains that examining the communication networks of the warfighter, the unit, 
or the command will not fully explain military system’s behavior of command and 
control. As Capra (2010) asserts, network behavior is contextual in nature. Examining 
any system as a part, separate from its network context, will not explain the system’s 
behavior.  
Taking the contextual-behavior concept deeper, Capra asserts that systems 
thinking is changing the metaphor of knowledge itself (p.39, 1996). He contrasts systems 
thinking with a historically accepted metaphor of knowledge as a building. In Capra’s 
view, past scientists have used accepted fundamental laws and principles as the 
foundation of their work. Their work can thus be seen as building up from those 
foundations. Capra quotes Descartes (p. 38, 1996) to illustrate: “‘[the sciences] borrow 
their principles from philosophy, I considered that nothing solid could be built on such 
shifting foundations.’” Relating fields of study to architecture is still commonplace, as it 
is a well-known analogy to first learn the basics, i.e., building blocks, of a given field. 
According to Capra, systems thinking changes the metaphor of knowledge from one of 
buildings to one of networks, relationships, and interrelated events. Systems theorists 
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view reality as an inseparable network of relationships (Capra, p.40, 1996). Capra states 
that if all natural phenomena are interconnected, one would need to understand all 
interconnections to explain any single phenomenon (p.41, 1996). Since the task of 
knowing every variable is daunting, Capra offers an example that a systems approach is 
still viable through approximate knowledge. To demonstrate that approximate knowledge 
already in common practice, Capra offers a science teacher dropping an object in front of 
a class. The teacher provides a formula to calculate the time it will take the object to hit 
the ground. Capra (p. 41, 1996) offers that although the formula produces an approximate 
result, it will not be entirely exact. Instead, the class would need to account for air 
resistance to achieve more accuracy. Additionally, to air resistance depends on ambient 
temperature and pressure. Capra chases the formula deeper, offering that air pressure also 
depends on the air’s movement in the room. The air in the room can be affected by an 
open window or even the students’ breath. There Capra’s analogy stops. Perhaps even 
before the effects of the observers are accounted for, the value in the approximation is 
adequate. Ultimately, all interconnections cannot be considered. Capra’s point is that 
learning is still achieved through approximate knowledge even when all interconnections 
are not considered. 
It is central to this study to apply the systems thinking concepts of approximate 
knowledge and studying an object’s interconnections, vice studying the object itself. This 
research does not attempt to predict the value of employing a projectile in a military 
network. Instead, the study develops and employs projectile-based nodes in order to 
observe information flow within a disruption-based network. The projectiles, as objects 
themselves, and any observations of their qualities are secondary in nature and only exist 
to inform the primary information flow objective. However, the projectile’s inherently 
ephemeral nature is a key characteristic that allows observations to be made about the 
effects of its connections in the testbed network. Ultimately, the purpose of this research 
is to examine information pattern differences in a network physically organized in a 
fundamentally different way—discretionary in time and space.  
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2. Barabasi’s Party: Nodes, Links, and Clusters 
Barabasi, like Capra, is a key influence in systems thinking. Barabasi (2014) 
provides networking examples that highlight a means with which to perceive the patterns 
of networks. In Linked, Barabasi describes a party with 100 guests, each of whom is 
invited because they do not know any of the other guests. After a few minutes, Barabasi’s 
guests begin to gather in groups of two or three, exchanging pleasantries and becoming 
casual acquaintances. In Barabasi’s social context, the guests are nodes, their mingling 
forms links, and groups of interlinked guests become clusters. After a few more minutes, 
some guests mingle into other groups, thereby connecting several clusters together 
through the mutual acquaintances of the mingling guest. At this point in the party, 
Barabasi introduces two pieces of information: that one wine at the party is more 
desirable than another, and that this information is secret. Sooner than one might assume, 
the majority of guests at the party know the secret, and Barabasi’s preferred wine is 
depleted.  
Nodes, clusters, and links are useful elements with which to examine and describe 
a networks organization. Clusters are groups of nodes within a network, be they party-
goer nodes in Barabasi’s example, team member nodes in a tactical unit, or autonomous 
system nodes acting in a tactical network. A link, then, is comprised dually of the nodes’ 
knowledge of one another and by the nodes’ means to communicate with each other. 
Clusters, nodes, and links can be viewed in a computer network from the different 
network layers of the OSI stack (Comer, 2014). At the data link layer, computers in a 
local area network (LAN) are nodes linked through their network interface cards (NIC) to 
each other through a hub or switch. The LAN is the cluster. Connecting together LAN 
clusters occurs at the next layer in the hierarchy, the network layer (Comer, 2014). 
Routers appear as nodes at the networking layer, forming links to other clusters through 
routing tables and physical media.  
In this study, a military force employing a disruption-based network is viewed as 
a complete system. The data network itself is a system within the military force system. 
The data network exists as a communication mechanism for the force. The purpose of the 
force’s communication network is to coordinate actions and create shared awareness 
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among nodes and clusters. Both the data network and the force system are observed in 
terms of cluster, nodes, and links. The data network’s clusters are observed as groups of 
mesh nodes. Links are the logical connections between the nodes created by the protocols 
executing at different layers of the OSI stack. The military force system’s clusters are 
comprised of the warfighters working together in teams. Clusters may also include 
unmanned systems working together as teams. Links are the connections between 
warfighters or unmanned systems, between teams, and between units within a force. 
These links are composed of two things: shared knowledge of one another between any 
two nodes and the shared means of communication between them. Using this framework, 
and team composed of nodes will have links between the team’s nodes and potentially 
multiple links to other teams. 
3. Granovetter’s Strong and Weak Ties 
Barabasi (2014) uses Granovetter’s The Strength of Weak Ties (1973) to give a 
lens through which to perceive how information flows from a given node in a network to 
a seemingly unrelated distant node. Granovetter (1973) addresses social networks in an 
attempt to tie micro-level social connections to macro-level social patterns. Granovetter’s 
fundamental question equates to ‘how do people’s relationships translate into societal 
trends?’ Granovetter analyzes the strength of interpersonal links, defining the strength of 
a link by a combination of time, emotional intensity, intimacy, and by the mutual services 
each node provides to each other (1973). Granovetter suggests that when selecting any 
two nodes from an arbitrary cluster, the strength of the tie between the two nodes is a 
good predictor of the proportion of interlinks between other nodes. Consider two people 
in a small social group. If those two people consider each other good friends, Granovetter 
(1973) suggests that there is a higher likelihood that the other people in the group will all 
know each other. Conversely, if the two people are merely acquaintances, Granovetter 
suggests that the other people in the group may not know each other. In a systems 
thinking sense, Granovetter’s hypothesis means that each node in a cluster is likely to be 
linked to every other node if at least a two of the nodes are strongly linked to each other 
(p. 1362, 1973). 
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Barabasi (2014) points out that where Granovetter’s hypothesis gets interesting is 
when the information flow is examined. Granovetter (1973) asked people who changed 
jobs in a Boston suburb how often they saw the contact that gave them the information 
that connected them to their new jobs. To Granovetter, the natural line of thinking is that 
those who share stronger ties will be more motivated to help their job seeker friend find a 
new job. However, Granovetter’s study revealed that only 16% of the job seekers saw 
their helping-contact frequently. Most of the new jobs (83.4%) came through leads 
provided by contacts that the job-seeker reported only seeing occasionally or rarely. 
Barabasi (2014) points out that if all nodes in the cluster know each other, they are also 
more likely to know the same information. New information, therefore, is more likely to 
come by way of a weak link from a separate cluster. Although initially it appears 
counterintuitive that a job-seeker will find a new job through a weak link, by observing 
information flow it becomes reasonable to think that weak ties can be very important in 
any network. A biologist might point out that although a bee is not permanent features of 
a flower beds in a neighborhood, they serve the important role of cross-pollenating. 
Figure 13 is extracted from page 43 of Barabasi’s Small Worlds Link (Chapter 4) in order 
to illustrate the link strength concept. 
 
Figure 13.  Strong and Weak Ties. Source: Barabasi (2014).  
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Unlike Granovetter’s social ties, the links that form between nodes in an 
information technology system do not achieve their strength by the length of time that 
they are connected, or by their emotional intensity or intimacy, or even by the mutual 
services they provide each other. In this study, weak ties indicate that the link connects 
separate clusters together. Strong ties are those that can be observed within the clusters 
themselves. This study uses the strong and weak tie concept as a tool to compare 
information flow in a disruption-based network testbed with information flow in 
persistent networks. Through such a comparison, the study evaluates strong and weak tie 
roles while operating within a disruption-based network construct.  
4. Feedback Loops: Weiner’s Boat and Viral Videos 
A significant element to be observed during this study is that of feedback. In The 
Web of Life, Capra defines feedback in a broad sense as “the conveying of information 
about the outcome of any process or activity to its source” (1996, p. 57). In systems 
theory, as Capra points out, feedback exists as feedback loops—either self-balancing or 
self-reinforcing. Capra (1996) cites cyberneticist Weiner’s 1948 boat and steersman as an 
example of the self-balancing feedback loop. When a boat’s path deviates from the 
steersman’s desired course, the steersman pushes the rudder in the direction of the 
deviation. The boat’s deviation from the desired path is decreased, possibly even beyond 
the optimal point and into another deviation. The steersman reassesses the course, 
adjusting the rudder to continuously correct the boat’s path. Self-balancing feedback 
loops behave in a goal-seeking manner. Another useful example of a self-balancing 
feedback loop is provided by Senge in The Fifth Discipline (2006). Senge shows that 
filling a glass of water is a continuous process of monitoring the water level and 
operating the faucet. As the water nears the desired level, one turns the faucet to slow the 
water down, and eventually turns the water off at close to the desired level. Figure 14 




Figure 14.  Filling a Faucet. Source: Senge (2006).  
Self-reinforcing feedback loops exhibit behavior commonly referred to as vicious 
cycles (Capra, p.63, 1996). Self-reinforcing feedback loops are also called deviation 
amplifying and runaway loops. That is, self-reinforcing feedback loops show signs that 
all causal influences act in the same direction (p.60, 1996). Senge (2006) offers a simple 
self-reinforcing sales feedback loop, shown in Figure 15. In the causal loop, more 
satisfied customers lead to more positive word of mouth, which in turn leads to more 
sales. If an anomaly occurs in the company, say a new product is faulty, and customers 
are not happy with their purchases, those customers give less positive word of mouth. 
Sales start to decline because the word is not as positive, which in turn starts to produce 
fewer satisfied customers.  
 
Figure 15.  Reinforcing Sales Process. Source: Senge (2006).  
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A modern example of a self-reinforcing feedback loop is a video or meme that is 
said to go viral on the Internet. The vast majority of Internet content never goes viral. 
However, a certain few seem to reach a critical threshold where they begin to become 
more popular precisely because they are already popular.  
Capra credits Maruyama (p.63, 1996) with creating “+” and “-” labels assigned to 
each causal link. Links whose influence spur actions in the same direction are labeled “+” 
and links whose influences spur actions in the opposite direction are labeled “-” (Capra, 
p.60). Labeling is a critical step because feedback loops seldom exist in such simple 
terms as the steersman, the faucet, and the sales process. A given system may have many 
causal links in a loop, and many loops may exist within the system. As Capra states, 
feedback loops are “abstract patterns of relationships embedded in the activities of 
[systems]” (p.64, 1996). As a simple rule, Capra states that a feedback loop “will be self-
balancing (-) if it contains and odd number of negative links and self-reinforcing if it 
contains and even number of negative links” (p. 61, 1996). This study will search for 
critical feedback loops and attempt to trace causal links in the disruption-based network 
testbed in order to examine and explain network behavior and information flow.  
The feedback loops observable in this study exist within the layers in the OSI 
architecture (Comer, 2011) and also exist within the cognitive domain. A feedback loop 
exists at the physical and network layers, where the EM signal of a given mesh node (N1) 
is received by another mesh node (N2). N2 then decides what to do, choosing either to 
ignore, respond, trust or challenge for authentication, repeat or route the received signal. 
Each of these actions depends on the protocol of the mesh node, and the action itself is 
the next step in the feedback loop. N2’s response signals back to N1. The network clusters 
converge over the link during flight, transmit critical information, and then effectively 
break back into separate clusters once the projectile is destroyed. In chapter IV, this study 
proposes a model in which perceived gaps in critical shared knowledge act as the 
feedback for creating the network via a burst. These bursts then allow for information to 
flow, which closes the perceived gap in critical shared knowledge. 
 50 
5. Adaptation 
Feedback is closely related to the systems property of adaptation that this study 
will examine in depth. Adaptation, in fact, is a function of feedback (Capra, p. 56, 1996). 
Capra writes that the interplay of feedback and adaptation is that the first link is affected 
by the last in the feedback loop. Feedback is what drives system adaptation.  
Creating the data network, in the context of this study, is a deliberate choice and 
an adaptation. The projectile operator has the responsibility to choose the moment to 
create a larger network by connecting distributed clusters. The network clusters converge 
over the link during flight, transmit critical information, and then effectively break back 
into separate clusters once the projectile is destroyed. The burst transmissions allow for 
command and control communications. Those communications allow for the force to 
conduct decision-making and to ultimately adapt to the tactical scenario. 
6. Delay 
Feedback loops rarely exist without delay. Sterman (2010) states that delays are 
processes whose outputs lag behind their inputs. Delays commonly have dramatic effects 
in the results of feedback loops. Sterman (2010) describes material and information 
delays, modeling first-order and higher-order examples of both. Delays tend to make 
elements in a feedback loop overshoot the optimal solution, which produces oscillation 
(Sterman, 2010). Weiner’s (1948) steersman example, given as one of the first in systems 
thinking and remaining one of the most simple, includes a delay. Capra (1996) mentions 
that the steersman may actually push the rudder long enough to go through the optimal 
course correction, and only after the steersman perceives the new deviation is another 
countersteer possible. Senge (2010) provides a useful example of the oscillation produced 
by delays. Consider person beginning to shower. The person makes an initial guess at the 
right temperature setting by turning the knobs on. Cold water initially shoots from the 
shower head. Hot water is delayed by the cold water that remains in the pipes. Impatient 
and uncomfortable, the person in the shower turns the knobs hotter, only to experience 
scalding-hot water in a few moments. Now perturbed by the hot water, the shower 
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reverses the knobs to a colder setting again. Figure 16 shows Senge’s self-balancing 
feedback loop with the added delay element. 
 
Figure 16.  Balancing Process with a Delay: A Sluggish Shower. Source: 
Senge (2006).  
Our initial intuitions are that delays are an important variable in bursty tactical 
networks. Perhaps networks with persistent connections became popular because they 
minimize delay. However, persistent connections are not feasible in the future operating 
environment. Therefore, this study will observe the effect of delay in the information 
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IV. EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
This chapter describes the study’s multi-part discovery experiments and the 
methodology used to design them. We designed and conducted experiments that were 
sufficient to explore the creation of an actual physical network just in time to 
accommodate the bursts of application layer data required for command and control.  
We planned our discovery experiments in four phases. During Phase I we planned 
to conduct a feasibility analysis. In Phase I, we hypothesized that we could create a 
suitable prototype by carefully selecting of a very small mesh radio, power supply, and 
microprocessor and inserting it as a payload into 3D printed assembly of our own design. 
Phase II consisted of discovery experiments designed to test the hypothesis that simulated 
command and control information would be retrieved from a remote node positioned out 
of communications range using the short-burst of the projectile during flight. We wanted 
to test whether we could create a networking burst that would exist for just long enough 
for the decision maker to receive the message from the remote node. Phase III consisted 
of more advanced discovery experiments. We designed Phase III to test the hypothesis 
that we could use a burst in the network to transmit movement instructions to a UGV and 
visually confirm the UGV’s movement. The UGV’s movement would prove that actions 
can be executed between the bursts, effectively beginning a feedback loop of command 
and control. The Phases II and III hypotheses were designed to prove the concept that it is 
possible to physically create and use a network during short bursts. We dub this approach 
distrupted tactical networking. Our task required us to condense all layered traffic in 
order to support requirements driven by the command and control processes during a 
given tactical scenario. Phase IV consisted of demonstration experiments, illustrating a 
few of the possible implementations of disruption-based networks in the future operating 
environment. The demonstrations were planned to be simple animated vignettes designed 
to give the reader a better picture of the networking by burst idea. We refined our 
prototype through all four Phases of our campaign of experiments. Figure 17 shows our 




Figure 17.  Experiment Campaign Design 
We designed the campaign of experiments using the multi-space criteria model. 
Section A details our experiment design process while section B discusses the final 
design of our experiments. 
A. MULTI-SPACE CRITERIA MODEL 
The multi-space criteria model includes design space, functional, and criteria 
space constraints (Figure 18). These constraints define the feasible solution set for 
creating a suitable prototype for additional experiments (Statnikov & Statnikov, 2011). 
The design variables are the independent variables under the immediate control of the 
systems designer (Alberts, 2002). Design variables impact the criteria achieved. 
Functional constraints also impact the criteria achieved by the experiment. Functional 
constraints are those that must be accepted by the experiment designer. The experiment 
designer does not control functional constraints. Functional constraints may be outside 
the scope of the study, appear randomly, or may be necessary to accept in order to 
conduct the experiment. Together, design space variables and functional constraints 
produce criteria variables. Criteria are the observed results of an experiment. Criteria 
space constraints are the results that will provide sufficient measure for the experiment’s 
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Figure 18.  The Geometrical Interpretation of the PSI Method. Adapted 
from Statnikov & Statnikov, 2011. 
In Figure 18, α1 represents the first design space constraint. α2 represents the 
second design space constraint. Together, α1 and α2 form the feasible area of the design 
space containing several solutions (N). N solutions are then functionally constrained, 
which further reduces the number of suitable solutions. Finally, fewer solutions fall 
within the feasible area of the criteria space constraints. In Figure 18, Φ1 and Φ2 represent 
single constraints. In most experiments, this one notwithstanding, more than two 
constraints exist in the design space and the criteria space. Figure 18 illustrates the 
concept in a way that will help frame the constraints this study considers while creating 
the projectile-based prototypes and designing the discovery experiments.  
Table 1 shows the design space, functional, and criteria space constraints in this 
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The following portions of this section detail how each constraint impacted our 
experiment design and ultimately shaped the results we obtained. 
1. Design Variable Constraints 
The design space constraints we considered while creating the projectile-based 
mesh node prototype include the components that control the node’s behavior. These 
variables include: a) the mesh radio, b) the microprocessor, c) the descent control 
mechanism, d) the launcher type, and e) the network topology.  
a. Mesh Radio 
We selected Virtual Extension (VE) 209S mesh radios for use in our experimental 
networks (Virtual Extension, n.d.). VE mesh (VEmesh) radio modules measured 38.1mm 
by 21.6mm and were light weight. VE mesh modules connect to nodes through UART 
connections and the RS-232 protocol. The VE mesh modules ran on 3.6 volts direct 
current. Our VE gateway connected through USB to our Windows-based work station. 
Virtual Extension provides a programmable interface that enables the network manager 
to set variables such as baud rate and number of hops. Virtual Extension also provides a 
graphic user interface (GUI) for data collection through the gateway. Figure 19 shows the 
VE mesh gateway and mesh radio modules. 
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Figure 19.  Virtual Extension Components. Source: Virtual Extension. 
(n.d.). 
The VE mesh network uses TDMA at layer 2 to do frequency hopping spread 
spectrum (FHSS) in the sub-GigaHertz industrial, scientific, medical (ISM) band. VE 
mesh’s novel approach to routing at layer 3 is to use Simulcast. Figure 20 shows the 
Simulcast concept.  
 
Figure 20.  Simulcast. Source: Virtual Extension (n.d.). 
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Simulcast eliminates the need for routing table maintenance and the overhead 
associated with determining a single propagation path through the network. Instead of 
routing tables, each node synchronizes onto a pseudo-random sequence of hops inside the 
total bandwidth. Figure 21 illustrates analog bandwidth. Consider each bar to represent 
one of the possible hops by the mesh radios. 
 
Figure 21.  Definition of Analog Bandwidth. Source: Comer (2010). 
When no nodes are transmitting, all nodes listen in synchronization for a few 
milli-seconds (ms) at the frequency in the sequence. When the initiating node transmits, 
all other nodes listen and nodes within range of the initiating node receive the datagram. 
Those nodes then retransmit in the next time slot at the next frequency—simultaneously. 
The initiating node listens for the retransmission to confirm it was received, and stops 
sending that datagram. In Figure 20, the VEmesh—3
rd
 hop shows the subsequent nodes 
hearing the retransmission, and then retransmitting again in the next time slot at the next 
frequency. 
As design variables, the VEmesh module’s characteristics made it capable of 
providing our criterion variables—the experiment’s results. Specifically, their low cost 
and small size allowed us to place them inside three-dimensional (3D) printed projectiles. 
Their low power consumption allowed us to select a small, 3.6 volt lithium ion battery to 
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include in the projectile. For example, some of the VEmesh modules’ other 
characteristics also acted as constraints in our experiments, markedly impacting our 
results. The RS-232 protocol allows for a small number of Bytes per datagram, which 
limited the amount of data we could successfully transmit during the brief flight. 
Additionally, the VEmesh network’s TDMA and FHSS protocols required significant 
time for synchronization in experiments in which we powered on nodes for the first time 
during the projectile shot. The synchronization time was controllable by selecting the 
number of frequencies to hop between. The default was 20 hops which measured 10–14 
seconds for synchronization during our experiments. We set the hops to zero, but were 
unable to reduce synchronization time to below eight seconds, which was the effective 
time of flight. Through personal communications with VEmesh, we discovered that the 5 
volts is eased onto the circuit upon start up. Rolling the power out the the circuit slowly 
protects the VEmesh modules’ components, but negatively impacted our ability to 
communicate while the projectile was in flight. Thus, both synchronization time and 
power-on cycle limited the total time available to transfer data. 
The VEmesh gateway we used also had a unique effect on the criteria space. Our 
VEmesh gateway connected via a universal serial bus (USB). We attempted to monitor 
network behavior using WireShark to monitor the USB port. Our results were interesting. 
Although we could determine the time and type of network commands, the PCAP record 
indicated that network traffic occurred every few milliseconds. Those milliseconds were 
due to the USB port interfacing with the Windows computer, rather than the radio 
conducting network functionality. Our PCAP file also failed to capture the layer 2 TDMA 
synchronization traffic. VEmesh gateway models that connect via Ethernet would 
provide much better observation of network traffic. 
b. The Microprocessor 
The next design variable we selected was the microprocessor to couple with the 
VEmesh modules. We selected Arduino
TM
 Pro Mini shown in Figure 22.  
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Figure 22.  Arduino Pro Mini. Source: Arduino (n.d.) 
Arduinos are small, cost-friendly, easily programmable, open-source platforms 
that provide a lot of flexibility in use (Arduino, n.d.). The Arduino is not a computer with 
an operating system (OS) capable of running applications and has finite internal memory. 
Arduino provides a programming interface as well. Programs written in the Arduino 
interface are called sketches. In our first experiments, we designed a sketch that included 
an accelerometer, barometer, and tilt-sensor. We designed our sketch to collect flight data 
from the sensors on ascent, sense apogee, and then act as a relay on descent. By sensing 
apogee, we instructed the Arduino Pro Mini to deploy a parachute. As a design variable, 
the Arduino also impacted our criteria. Our initial design was to transmit flight data 
through VEmesh to the gateway as the Arduino’s sensors collected it. This limited the 
duration of flight time that would be used to transmit data to or from remote nodes. If the 
Arduino was an operating system, flight characteristics would be easily stored locally for 
retrieval after descent.  
c. The Descent Control Mechanism 
The descent control mechanism was a design constraint in this study. We chose a 
parachute. The first prototypes had a 24 inch nylon parachute. Later models had a 48 inch 
parachute to accommodate greater size and weight. A descent control mechanism is not a 
required feature in a projectile-based network. Hypothetically, projectiles could be 
destroyed after each use or left to operate from the ground. However, destroying the 
prototypes in this study would limit the number of observations possible. On average, 
each projectile took more than 10 hours to 3D print and assemble. Although we included 
a descent mechanism for our nodes, disposability may prove to be a desirable quality in 
 61 
future projectile models. It seems equally likely, though, that the parachute could be a 
desirable feature to extend service time for data communications.  
d. The Launcher 
The projectile’s launcher was also a design variable, as well as the angle of 
deployment and trajectory in relation to the remote node. We envisioned using a standard 
M203 grenade launcher. However, concerns about access, safety restrictions, and firing 
range time led us to search for suitable alternatives. We first examined the range we 
would need for our projectile. The desirable flight range was informed by the range of 
our signals. Our VEmesh node signal range, given the single wire antenna and 3.6V 
battery, was less than 200 meters. We looked for launchers with ranges from 100 to 400 
meters. We built a standard spud gun from 2” and 4” PVC pipe but we experienced an 
unacceptable power variance with our initial prototypes. Subsequently, we found the 
pneumatic line thrower (PLT) by Restech Norway (Restech Norway, n.d.). The PLT 
family of products is designed for sea-based operations including vessel to vessel, 
anchoring, man overboard, and whale tagging. The Restech Rescue 230 has an advertised 
230 meter minimum range. The PLT Mini has a range of around 100 meters. We decided 
to use both the Rescue 230 and the PLT Mini. Figure 23 shows the Rescue 230 and 
Figure 24 shows the PLT Mini. 
 
Figure 23.  Rescue 230. Source: Restech Norway (n.d.).  
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Figure 24.  PLT Mini. Source: Restech Norway (n.d.).  
e. Network Topology 
Network topology was an additional design variable in Phase II and Three of our 
experiments. Specifically, we chose placement of the VE Mesh gateway and base station, 
the number of clusters and nodes. In Phase II, we determined that placing a single remote 
node out of signal range from the base station was sufficient. We programmed the 
Arduino Pro Mini in the remote node with simulated critical command and control 
information. The projectile in our first experiment would pass through a point where it 
would maintain a signal with the gateway and make a connection with the remote node. 
Figure 25 is a visualization of the experiment concept.  
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Figure 25.  Connection Time Visualization 
According to Alberts (2002), the tactical scenario can be adjusted to provide the 
opportunity to observe the criteria space variables systematically while manipulating the 
design variables. We planned to adjust our tactical scenarios to observe the criteria while 
manipulating the design variables. Those adjustments are captured in detail in the next 
chapter. 
2. Functional Constraints 
The functional constraints are variables that are accepted by the users of the 
system or environmental factors (Alberts, 2002). Alberts (2002) dubs functional 
constraints as intervening variables. Functional constraints impact the relationship 
between the design space and criteria space variables. This study was impacted by several 
functional constraints.  
We accepted that the scale of our experiments had to remain small because of 
several general constraints. At the most basic level, this study had to be completed during 
the course of 18 months. If additional manipulation of design variables is necessary, we 
recommend that it be done in future work. We also had limited access to sites where we 
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could fire the pneumatic line thrower. We also lacked the ability to scale up any scenario 
because of the number of pneumatic line throwers available. While we could form 
clusters of terrestrial-based nodes, interconnecting them with the use of a projectile was 
naturally limited. We therefore chose to use a two-cluster experimental design. 
Another functional constraint we accepted was the lack of a commercially 
available bursty-networking node prototype for our use during the study. We attempted to 
test Rafael’s FireFly and AeroVironment’s BlackWing, but were unsuccessful in gaining 
access for testing purposes. We therefore planned Phase I as a feasibility analysis test 
whether we could prototype our own. We 3D modeled several body assemblies, printed 
the assemblies using Ultimaker 3D printers, and used commercially available 
components to make a working prototype. We also accepted the mesh networking 
protocols, routing protocols, and security protocols in the mesh radios that we selected. 
Changing these protocols to observe their effect on the criteria space variables was not 
feasible because of work capacity and time. Similarly, we accepted the antenna type and 
power at the receiver and transmitter as functional constraints. Those variables play an 
integral role in the signal range but are already contained within the mesh radios available 
for use in this study.  
3. Criteria Space Constraints 
Criteria space variables are the dependent variables that are the outputs. 
According to Alberts (2002), criteria space variables are the products of the system, 
representing the behaviors that are important to the success of military operations. A 
criteria space constraint is the output that is required to answer the research questions and 
meet the objective of the study. As a proof of concept thesis, our primary criteria space 
constraint was that we needed to confirm that command and control information could be 
successfully communicated through the projectile. Command and control information is 
application layer (layer 7) data. We predetermined several criteria space variables that 
would help inform us about desirable qualities of a bursty networking node to help us 
observe the flow of information in a disruption-based network. 
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Our criteria space variables during the experiments included flight range, signal 
range, time of flight, and the time of connection. The time of connection in this study is 
defined as the duration of time when the receiving nodes receive the transmitting node’s 
propagated signal and the SNR is sufficient to permit data transfer (Stanley and Jeffords, 
2006). Time of connection can be visualized during flight as the time at which the 
receiving node enters within the lobe of the transmitting node’s propagated signal 
through the time that the receiving node departs the transmitting node’s lobe or the time 
at which the projectile touches down on the surface. Figure 25 illustrates the connection 
time variable. Time variables are observed in seconds. Data received is also a criteria 
space variable in the discovery experiments. Collected in bytes, data is observed at the 
base station co-located with the deployment mechanism and the shooter. 
In subsequent experiments, time of connection and data transmitted remained as 
observable variables. However, the criteria space constraints expanded. The study sought 
to transmit application-level data over the disruption-based network. Additionally, 
criteria space constraints included observations of the level of shared understanding by 
the nodes and clusters. While observable with transmitted data stored in unmanned 
systems and subsequent node behavior, observing shared understanding among human 
tactical role players and teams would require prior tasking to make them record their 
understanding during the experiments and post-experiment collection during after-action 
sessions. 
4. Relationships Between Variables 
The study expected to reveal several relationships among the variables. Beginning 
with the criteria space variables, data transmitted is proportional to connection time. 
Likewise, time of flight can be proportional to connection time, given that the vector of 
flight in relation to the separated nodes and clusters supports the relationship. That is, if 
the flight trajectory brings the projectile within range of the separated node, additional 
flight time within signal range will allow for a greater amount of data to be transferred. 
However, if the trajectory takes the projectile in a direction away from the separated 
node, greater flight time will not influence the amount of data transferred. We also 
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expected to see a direct relationship between protocols inherent in our components and 
the overall network convergence time. The next section provides a detailed description of 
the phases in our campaign, beginning with an overview and finishing with a subsection 
for each phase. 
B. PHASES OF EXPERIMENTATION 
We began Phase I by selecting components to include in our feasibility analysis. 
We then created projectile-based mesh nodes that are suitable for testing in subsequent 
discovery experiments. Next, we tested the prototypes for suitability and flight 
characteristics. Once we determined that we had a functioning prototype, we proceeded 
to Phase II and conducted simple discovery experiments. In the first experiment, we co-
located the node, the gun, and the gateway. We shot the prototype toward a single remote 
node positioned out of range but attempting to transmit data back to the gateway. The 
projectile acted as a single hop, connecting the remote node and the gateway. Phase III 
included in an event where we were able to transmit command and control instructions to 
an autonomous unmanned ground vehicle (UGV). Phase III served primarily as advanced 
discovery experiments, where we confirmed our observations from Phase II and gained 
more detailed observations about information flow in a short-living network. The simple 
experiments during Phases II and III are a simple proof of concept.  
We concluded our experiment campaign with Phase IV. During Phase IV, we 
created several demonstration vignettes to illustrate the overall potential of the 
disruption-based networking concept and some of the possible applications. Subsequent 
paragraphs detail the prototyping process, the initial discovery experiments during Phase 
II, advanced discovery experiments during Phase III, and detail the vignettes created 
during Phase IV. 
1. Phase I—Feasibility Analysis 
Phase I was a feasibility analysis. Without commercially available assets to use in 
our networking-by-burst experiments, we hypothesized that it was feasible to create our 
own using readily available, inexpensive components. Our task was to produce a working 
network node capable of achieving the criteria during our experiments. In order to 
 67 
produce such a node, we needed to combine the design constraint variables of our multi-
space criteria. Phase I design constraint variables included the mesh radio, micro-
processor, descent control mechanism, and launcher. Since each selected design variable 
would inevitably introduce functional constraints, we were especially cognizant of our 
criteria constraints and sought ways to simplify variables in order to produce just what 
was needed in order for us to observe sufficient criteria. The prototyping process was 
broken down into two concurrent lines of effort. Those lines of effort were 1) component 
integration and programming, and 2) assembly design and creation. Both efforts evolved 
incrementally. Decisions we made in one line of effort led us to adjust the design of the 
other effort.  Challenges we discovered in assembly design impacted our component 
integration effort. Likewise, issues we discovered with integration and program drove the 
evolution of our assembly design. The following paragraphs are a narrative of the 
prototyping process and our feasibility analysis. 
We began with a very basic design for Prototype 1. We built a common 
combustion-type spud gun with a 50.8 (2 inch) inner diameter. Prototype 1, depicted in 
Figure 26, included a payload bay for the electronic components and micro-servo. The 
micro-servo held a rubber band that kept the parachute in the parachute bay by holding 
the base cap. Our programming line of effort began with a simple timer sketch in 
Arduino’s IDE. The sketch is included for reference purposes in Appendix A. The timer 
sketch provided a time delay after power up that allowed us to test Prototype 1’s descent 
mechanism after launch. We used Trimble’s open source 3D modeling software, 
SketchUp, to quickly produce standard tessellation (.stl) files for 3D printing. We printed 




Figure 26.  Prototype 1: Developed in SketchUp 
Bench tests with Prototype 1 showed us that the rubber band was not strong 
enough to compress our spring. The rubber band also occasionally caught in the relief 
channels and the barrel. Concurrent launch testing also demonstrated that the spud gun 
we created did not produce consistent power to shoot the projectile along a reproducible 
path. Power differences were noticeable between shots. We were able to discover the 
power reliability problem in the spud gun even before installing the payload into the 
assembly. We began designing Prototype 2 with the tasks of selecting a new suitable 
launcher and subsequently redesigning the descent mechanism and projectile assembly. 
Prototype 2 was the first model designed for Restech Norway’s pneumatic line 
thrower (PLT). PLT’s barrel reduced the possible outer diameter of our projectile from 
50.8mm to 38.5mm. Because we did not believe that the parachute would condense 
inside the 38.5mm diameter, we envisioned a parachute door on the side of the projectile. 
We designed the upper portion of Prototype 2 to remain 50.8mm outer diameter. The 
door was held closed through direct contact with the micro-servo.  
While testing Prototype 2’s flight characteristics of, we discovered that the 
polylactic acid (PLA) housing failed to remain intact when shot from the PLT, at least at 
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the in-fill density of our prints. PLA is a biodegradable plastic that is quite common in 
additive manufacturing. PLA has a low melting temperature and resists shrinking and 
warping better than some of the other 3D printable plastics. We printed Prototype 2 with 
our Ultimaker 2+’s default settings for normal print quality (22% in-fill). Prototype 2 is 
depicted in Figure 27. 
  
Figure 27.  Prototype 2: Developed in SketchUp 
We adjusted Prototype 3 by returning the parachute bay to the aft of the projectile, 
accepting the reduced 38.5mm maximum usable diameter. In lieu of the rubber band 
system we added two rods on the plunger assembly to be held directly by the micro 
servo. We printed three Prototype 3s. We printed the first at 22% in-fill and the last at 
100% in-fill. We were confident of the flight characteristics with Prototype 3 but wanted 
to verify that the PLA would remain intact against our compressed air charge. Prototype 
3 is depicted in Figure 28. 
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Figure 28.  Prototype 3: Developed in SketchUp 
Our next step was to design the behavior of the projectile. We used a development 
board to create the circuitry for the payload. The development board is depicted in Figure 
29. We included an accelerometer, barometer, Arduino, VEmesh radio, and tilt sensor. 
We also included a micro servo in the payload, which is not depicted in Figure 29. 
  
Figure 29.  Prototype 1: Developed in SketchUp 
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Arduino provides an open source software called Arduino IDE which uses 
PYTHON language to create sketches. Sketches are compiled and then uploaded through 
the boot loader on the Arduino microprocessors. We wrote a sketch that included some 
feedback from the Arduino Pro Micro. We programmed the projectile to transmit an 
“INITIALIZED” message after start up. Upon being launched, the projectile transmitted 
a “LAUNCHED” message and began to feed a stream of flight characteristic messages 
back to the gateway. These flight characteristics included a time stamp, altitude, and 
acceleration. We used an accelerometer to sense the shot. Interestingly, we discovered 
that the acceleration spike occurred too quickly for the accelerometer to sense, so we had 
to adjust the frequency at which readings occurred. Shooting out of a gun, a projectile 
experiences instant acceleration and then graceful deceleration along the trajectory until 
impact. We added the altimeter’s changes as a second set of criteria with which to sense 
the shot. The altimeter was already installed in order to sense apogee, the highest point 
along the projectile’s trajectory. At apogee, we instructed the Arduino to send high 
voltage to the micro-servo, which let the spring expand and pushed the parachute out. 
With the parachute deployed, the Arduino transmitted a “DEPLOYED” message and 
began to act as a relay in the network. As a relay, the projectile could connect any other 
nodes in our experiment. We accepted that the relay mode would only be in effect during 
descent, even though that limited the total available time that command and control 
information could transfer between nodes.  
After designing the projectile’s behavior, we shifted back to our assembly line of 
effort. We removed the payload from the development board and soldered them for 
installation in Prototype 3. The soldered payload is shown in Figures 30 and 31. 
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Figure 30.  Prototype 3 Electronics  
  
Figure 31.  Prototype 3 Payload Assembly  
We inserted the 3D printed payload into upper assembly and proceeded to test by 
launching Prototype 3 with the PLT Mini. Prototype 3 remained intact at 100% in-fill and 
we deemed it acceptable for inclusion in our first discovery experiment. 
We noticed, however, that the altimeter was slow to sense apogee. Consequently, 
the parachute deployed late, limiting the relay mode duration. We added a tilt-sensor in 
an attempt to shorten the delay and maximize the projectile’s controlled descent time 
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under the parachute’s drag. Although the tilt-sensor worked flawlessly on the test bench, 
it acted unexpectedly in our first shots with the PLT. As the projectile left the barrel, the 
small ball inside the tilt sensor shot up the sensor barrel as it rebounded against the 
acceleration spike. The circuit opened in error and the parachute immediately deployed. 
We adjusted the sketch by logically attaching the tilt sensor to the Arduino only after the 
Arduino went into its “LAUNCHED” state. Our adjustment worked. We finished our 
sketch with instructions for the Arduino to transmit a “TOUCHDOWN” message when 
the projectile hit the ground. In those instructions, we told the Arduino to stop acting as a 
relay. Once on the ground, therefore, our network ceased to exist, although it could still 
function if programmed to do so. The Prototype 3 Arduino sketch is included for 
reference in Appendix B. 
Finally, satisfied with the projectile’s feedback functionality, we concluded our 
feasibility analysis. We proved Phase I’s hypothesis by creating a working projectile by 
combining commercially-available electronic components with a 3D-printed assembly. 
Our working prototype introduced several functional constraints that would impact the 
design of our Phase II experiments. These functional constraints included the flight and 
signal range, time of flight, as well the duration of time that Prototype 3 would act in 
relay mode. The next section describes our Phase II design. 
2. Phase II—Retrieving Data from a Remote Node 
During Phase II experiments we planned to co-locate the projectile with the USB 
gateway and Windows interface. The gateway and pneumatic line thrower simulated the 
node with reachback. We placed a remote node beyond signal range. The remote node 
simulated its own cluster. The simulated remote cluster had a command and control 
message that needed to be relayed back to someone. The C2 message was simply 
“MISSION ACCOMPLISHED. ALL UNITS BACK TO BASE.” Included in the remote 




Figure 32.  Phase II Experiment Topology  
Although the clusters were not comprised of many nodes, we believed that they 
met our criteria. We knew that successfully transmitting C2 data in the first experiment 
would suffice as a proof of concept that a network could be created just for the short 
amount of time required at the application layer, then disestablished after the projectile 
impacted the ground. We planned to capture the throughput, the time of flight, and the 
range in order to make observations about the network behavior. We added the captured 
C2 data by instructing the gateway to post the received data to the CENETIX server. 
Phase III would test whether or not a cluster could take action on received C2 instructions 
over a bursty network. Phase III is discussed in the next subsection. 
3. Phase III—Sending Data to a Remote Node 
Phase III experiments also co-located the gateway and the pneumatic line thrower. 
Phase III would test whether or not a cluster could act on received C2 instructions over a 
bursty network. To meet our criteria, we used a remote UGV and sent it movement 
instructions. We changed the Arduino sketch to hold the movement instructions until 
after parachute deployment. If successful, we would observe our UGV executing a zig 
zag pattern. This simplified experiment topology did not require coordination with role 
players, nor did it require the added sophistication of other types of movement 
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instructions such as new grid coordinates. Figure 33 shows the experiment topology 
during Phase III. 
 
Figure 33.  Phase III Experiment Topology  
4. Phase IV—Scenario Vignettes 
To conclude the campaign of experimentation, we created models of several 
potential tactical scenarios that employ a projectile-based node. These models were 
informed by data collected during the Phase II and Three experiments. These models 
represent a few hypothetical scenarios and are intended to illustrate the tactical 
applications for the reader. The amphibious raid vignette is available to watch at: 
https://youtu.be/k4xQExDC5l0. The unmanned undersea vehicle vignette is available to 
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V. EXPERIMENT OBSERVATIONS AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter provides experiment findings and our analysis. Observations made 
while carrying out the campaign of experimentation impacted the direction of follow-on 
experiments as we adjusted the prototypes and experiment design to test the bursty 
networking proof of concept. In order to capture the impact of observations made during 
experiment execution, we offer the Phase II and Three subsections as narratives followed 
by a list of observations by topic. At the end of the chapter we include an analysis. The 
analysis starts with a large perspective for the future use of bursty-networks in command 
and control of forces operating in EM-hostile conditions. The analysis concludes with an 
in depth look at what we believe to be desirable qualities of the short-living, highly 
mobile nodes in future bursty networks. 
A. EXPERIMENT OBSERVATIONS 
The following subsections record our observations during each phase of 
experimentation. 
1. Phase I—Feasibility Analysis Observations 
This section provides observations we collected during our feasibility analysis. 
Our hypothesis was that we could create our own suitable prototype for use in the final 
phases of our experiment campaign. During Phase I, we did successfully create a working 
prototype. Although our prototypes continued to evolve during Phases II and III, the 
observations provided in this section are solely from Phase I.  Tables 2-4 lists our 






Table 2.   Prototype 1 Observations 
Component Observation Modification 
50.8mm Spud Gun Variable power each launch Adopted PLT Mini and Restech 
Norway 230 models for launching 
follow-on prototypes 
Rubber Band Insufficent power to hold back 
spring 
Switch from rubber band to micro-




Friction and hard corners 
occasionally caused the rubber 
band to become stuck, delaying 
the parachute deployment 
Eliminate rubber band channels in 
follow-on prototypes 
Time-Delay Sketch Simple timer after power on 
produced unreliable deployment 
of parachute, either early or late 
during flight 
Add components and program them 




Stable. None required. 
Table 3.   Prototype 2 Specific Observations 
Component Observation Modification 
Upper Assembly 
Side Door for 
Parachute 
Side placement added air 
resistance during flight. Result 
was unstable flight path. 
Design parachute to deploy from base 
of projectile in follow-on prototypes 
Micro servo 
holding Bottom of 
Door 
Internal spring resistance 
created a protrusion at the top of 
the door, exacerbated by air 
flow during flight 
Design parachute to deploy from base 




Placing electrical components 
nearer to the impact of the 
launcher is not desirable due to 
greater force at launch. 
Design internal payload in upper 
assembly of follow-on prototypes 
Flight 
Characteristics 
Lack of stability during flight Design follow-on prototypes with 
better balance, both in regards to the 





Table 4.   Prototype 3 Observations 
Component Observation Modification 
Base Cap Cap designed to absorb impact 
at launch and be deployed with 
parachute was routinely 
destroyed by force at launch 
Design follow-on prototypes with 
more robust area to absorb initial 
impact at launch 
Micro Servo Arm Prototype 3 had two shafts that 
retained the spring and plunger 
in the parachute bay. These 
shafts put pressure on the micro 
servo’s arms that the torque 
could not release at deployment 
Design follow-on prototypes with a 
trigger mechanism. Micro Servo has 
sufficient torque to pull trigger, but 
not to retain shafts. 
Lower and Upper 
Assembly Join 
The join at the lower and upper 
assembly proved to be a weak 
point in the design. We 
compensated for its propensity 
to break by taping over it with 
duct tape. 




After loading the spring and 
inserting the parachute, putting 
together the projectile’s upper 
and lower assembly was tedious. 
Design follow-on prototype with an 
ease of loading in mind. 
Flight 
Characteristics 
Flight path was true. No 
observed wobble during flight. 
None required. 
   
 
 
2. Phase II—Remote Node Experiment Observations 
We conducted several incremental Phase II experiments from October 26 to 
October 29, 2016. Before departing for the range on the 27
th
, we tested Prototype 3’s 
functionality by hand. At the range, we relied on the Restech Norway PLT mini launcher. 
The PLT mini launcher is shown in Figure 34. We chose not shoot the Restech Norway 
230, which releases a greater amount of pressurized air for added range. We shot one 
Prototype 2 and three Prototype 3s on the range during the first experiment. Prototype 2 
did not have a payload. We shot it for the sole purpose of confirming flight 
characteristics. Prototype 2’s base module, designed to hold the payload, shattered under 
the force of the PLT mini on launch. The parachute bay, nose, and what was left of the 
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base flew in a wobbly manner, which confirmed our suspicions about its lack of flight 
worthiness.  
The first Prototype 3, printed at 22% in-fill, also shattered the bay closest to the 
base of the PLT mini. Figure 34 captures the first Prototype 3 launch.  
 
Figure 34.  Prototype Breaking On Launch  
The remaining part of the first Prototype 3, which is the orange plastic in Figure 34, flew 
approximately 50 meters high and 100 meters down range. A strong tail wind carried it 
significantly. Remarkably, the payload itself survived the shot. In fact, we were able to 
use the same payload bay until shooting on October 29
th
. 
Concerned about losing all of our prototypes on the first shot, we decided to 
suspend the projectile in the barrel using some duct tape. We wrapped the duct tape 
around the intersection of the payload bay and the parachute bay, thinking that placing it 
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there would add stability. The duct tape kept the projectile approximately 4 inches above 
the internal base of the launcher. The tape is visible in black in Figure 35. 
 
Figure 35.  Prototype Ready to Launch  
Our second shot with Prototype 3 remained intact throughout flight, but the 
parachute did not deploy. Figure 36 captures the trapped parachute. Time of flight was 
roughly six seconds without the parachute functioning. Zooming in on the captured 
image in Figure 36, the tail looks slightly wider than the nose of the projectile. This 
observation led us to believe that the parachute came partially out, but was unable to fully 
deploy. As recorded on Observer’s Notepad on 27 October in Figure 37, the projectile 
successfully initialized, launched, deployed, and then initialized again after landing. 
During the second trial, with Prototype 3, also successfully transmitted part of the C2 
message from the remote node. 
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Figure 36.  Prototype Passing Apogee  
  
Figure 37.  Observer Notepad Record of Data from Remote Node  
Our third and subsequent shots with Prototype 3 remained intact throughout 
flight, but the parachute proved unreliable. After seven more shots, our remaining 
Prototype 3s had cracked at the base and at the intersection between the payload bay and 
the parachute bay. We also damaged the micro servos. We decided to shoot the projectile 
a final time without a parachute bay. The shot without a parachute bay was not 
successful. The shot flew in a sideways spin and landed hard. Upon recovery, we noticed 
that the battery had came through the PLA wall of the payload insert, pushing the 
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electronics out of alignment, and ending the possibility of more trials during the first 
experiment phase. Figure 38 shows the damaged payload insert of Prototype 3. 
  
Figure 38.  Payload Damage  
In multiple trials we made a few observations that led us to modify our projectile 
design before proceeding with Phase III. Prototype-specific observations are included in 
Table 5. Given our required changes, we decided to adopt a larger prototype incorporate 
the already-existing hard plastic base attached to the projectile included with the PLT 
mini. We scaled up the projectile so that we could eventually incorporate a different mesh 
radio. We wanted to use Persistent Systems’ Wave Relay MPU-4 radios so we made our 
projectile Prototype 4 large enough to hold the entire circuit board from the MPU-4. For 
our Phase II experiments, we determined that we would need a trigger mechanism for the 




Table 5.   Phase II Prototype-Specific Observations 
Component Observation Modification 
Micro Servo Insufficient torque to release 
parachute spring 
Upgrade Micro Servo 
Add trigger insead of direct pressure 
PLA plastic Brittle to impact and pressure Change materials for exterior 
PLT Mini Insufficient range Upgrade to Restech Norway 230 
Parachute Bay Created too much surface 
tension for the parachute to slide 
through 
Expand the parachute bay 
Change to smoother materials 
Observations about the network functionality and behavior are included in Table 
6. Phase II experiments successfully connected two clusters together using a 3D-printed 
projectile for a duration required for one C2 message to be transmitted from a remote 
node to the gateway. 
Table 6.   Phase II Network Behavior Observations 
Element Specification Result 
C2 message Transmit short message from the 
remote node to the gateway 
Success: transmitted a short 
message 
Network Life Defined as the period of time that 
the two clusters were 
interconnected.  
Six seconds on average, through 
all Phase II experiment trials. 
RS 232 Protocol Limits number of total bits, as it 
fragments a given message into 
many small parts and has a definite 
maximum transmission limit. 
Success: Our reduced message size 
was able to be transferred after 
network established. 
Baud Rate 2400 bps selected on the VEmesh 
interface prior to the trials.  
Success: No errors noted on 
Observer’s Notepad. 
Interference Monitor network behavior for 
existence of interference. 
None noted during experiments. 
 
Given the number of projectile modifications required for Phase III experiments, 
we planned our Phase III experiments as a part of the larger CENETIX experiments and 
multi-domain network architecture at Camp Roberts, CA during the third week of March, 
2017. The CENETIX multi-domain architecture is depicted in Figure 39. 
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Figure 39.  CENETIX Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO) 2017—
Camp Roberts Phase Network Diagram 
The following section provides a narrative and observation table for our Phase III 
experiments at Camp Roberts in March, 2017. 
3. Phase III—Command and Control Message to Remote Nodes 
Phase III experiments were advanced discovery experiments designed to test 
whether or not a cluster could act on received C2 instructions over a bursty network. We 
conducted six trials during Phase III. To achieve our criteria, we used a remote UGV and 
sent it movement instructions. We modified the Arduino sketch to hold the movement 
instructions until after parachute deployment. If successful, we would observe our UGV 
executing a zig zag pattern. The prototype also evolved for Phase III experiments. Those 
changes are recorded in the following paragraphs, followed by a narrative of the conduct 
of Phase III. 
As stated in the previous section, we upgraded several systems from Prototype 3 
for Prototype 4. We included a micro-servo with more torque and designed a trigger 
mechanism for Prototype 4. To help redesign the deployment mechanism, we searched 
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for existing examples. The water rocket community had a variety of options available. 
After researching home-rocket options, we modeled our new deployment mechanism 
design after Air Command Water Rockets’ Shadow Model (Air Command, n.d.). Figure 
40 shows Prototype 4’s trigger mechanism comprised of aluminum parts. As depicted in 
Figure 40, the micro-servo in Prototype 4 did not retain the plunger like the micro-servo 
in Prototype 3. While demanding extra space, incorporating the trigger mechanism 
improved the probability that the parachute would consistently deploy.  
  
Figure 40.  Prototype 4 Payload Assembly 
While we planned to use the extra space for the MPU-4 radio when the parachute 
proved its reliability, we used the extra space to install the entire development board into 
the payload bay. Figure 41 shows the development board inside Prototype 4. 
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Figure 41.  Development Board Inside Prototype 4 
We also discarded the 3D-printed body in Prototype 4. We still used 3D-printed 
PLA parts for some internal parts, but we opted for a fiberglass cylinder for Prototype 4’s 
shell, aluminum for the internal structure, and milled polyethylene for major internal 
surfaces. We used a 3D Carbide Nomad 883 computer-numerical control (CNC) mill to 
mill the polyethylene and aluminum to specification. The Nomad 883 proved to be a 
great asset. Provided by the Robodojo, it allowed us to accurately and quickly 
manufacture robust parts. Additionally, we also borrowed a cylindrical shaft from a 
projectile that came with the Restech Norway 230 in order to successfully absorb more 
impact upon launch. The shaft was also made of polyethylene. Figure 42 shows Prototype 
4 with Restech Norway’s PLT mini. 
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Figure 42.  Prototype 4 With PLT Mini 
Our Prototype 4 design relied on the trigger assembly to separate the borrowed 
shaft from the payload bay at apogee and also to push the parachute out for deployment. 
We selected springs capable of creating adequate force. The trade-off for creating a 
bigger Prototype 4 with bigger springs and more impact-resistant materials was the 
projectile’s weight. Prototype 4 weighed nearly 3 lbs. Restech Norway’s PLT mini did 
not produce the range we required for Phase III experiments, so we adopted the Restech 
Norway 230. We also added a larger dive tank to the 230 model launcher. We added the 
larger dive tank to increase the number of shots possible without refill. Camp Roberts, 
our test site, is not located near facilities that can re-charge tanks. Because the pneumatic 
line throwers are a surrogate for traditional weapon systems, the modification did not 
affect our criteria space. Figure 43 shows the modified model 230 launcher.  
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Figure 43.  Rescue 230 Launcher with DIN-Style Dive Tank 
In preparation for Phase III experiments at Camp Roberts, we equipped the 
Segway-based UGV with a remote node. The remote node was comprised of another 
Arduino microprocessor, VEmesh module, and power supply. The remote node’s purpose 
was to receive the data payload from the gateway computer and instruct the UGV to 




Figure 44.  Unloading UGV at Camp Roberts 
Once we arrived at Camp Roberts, we located an area that was suited for our 
experiment. We chose a lightly used road and a empty field. The field and the road were 
separated by a berm. The berm was approximately two meters high. The berm’s heighth 
was sufficient to block the line-of-sight connection from the gateway to the UGV. We 
placed the UGV on the road, and drove with the gateway across the field. There we 
checked that the UGV and the gateway were not able to communicate directly with one 
another. Figure 45 depicts the Restech Norway 230 and Prototype 4 just before launch. 
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Figure 45.  Prototype 4 at Camp Roberts 
We executed six nearly identical trials in Phase III at Camp Roberts. During the 
first trial, the Arduino never sent a “LAUNCHED” message back to the gateway and the 
user interface. Since Arduino did not detect conditions for deployment, the projectile 
never sent C2 information to UGV. Prototype 4’s payload did not separate from the lower 
assembly. The prototype landed hard, with the lower assembly and payload still 
connected, all without the parachute deploying. After retrieving the projectile, we noticed 
a battery fault. The battery emitted no power. We suspected that the launch created the 
battery fault, which prevented the projectile from behaving according to our design. 
However, we could not rule out the possibility that the Arduino and VEmesh module did 
have power during flight and that our payload failed to sense the launch. We replaced the 
battery and bench tested the payload’s behavior. It behaved according to our design. 
Satisfied with our modifications, we proceeded to the second trial. 
The second trial exhibited the same behavior as the first experiment. The 
parachute did not deploy. Possible reasons included: accelerometer malfunction, 
barometer malfunction, reset sensor triggered during flight, or battery failure. We also 
noted that it took extra torque to separate the lower assembly from the payload after 
recovering Prototype 4 from the hard landing. We suspected that the spring and trigger 
inside the payload would be insufficient to create separation in future experiments. To 
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compensate for the torque necessary to separate the lower assembly from the payload, we 
used the recovery rope included with the Restech Norway kit and fastened it to the lower 
assembly. The idea behind the rope was that it would run out at apogee and then jerk the 
lower assembly away from the payload. Separated from the lower assembly, the payload 
would then be free to deploy the parachute. Figure 45 (above) shows Prototype 4 attached 
to the rope provided in the Restech Norway kit. 
We replaced the battery again for the third trial. While Prototype 4 did not lose 
power in the third trial, it failed to transmit a “DEPLOYED” message and begin to give 
C2 instructions to the UGV. Several seconds after landing, the UGV conducted 
maneuvers which indicated that the data was received by the remote node. The C2 
instructions were likely transmitted because our program sketch included a reset to 
“INITIALIZED” after 30 seconds.  
Trials four through six produced similar results to trial three. The parachute did not 
deploy and a short time after Prototype 4 landed, the UGV conducted its maneuvers. 
After producing consistent results, we decided that we needed to rethink our prototype 
and experiment model. We recorded our network behavior observations, which are 
provided in table 7. 
Table 7.   Phase III, Protoype 4, Network Behavior Observations 
Element Specification Result 
C2 message Transmit short message from the 
gateway to the UGV 
Success: transmitted a short 
message, UGV acted on instruction 
only after projectile was on the 
ground 
Network Life Defined as the period of time that 
the two clusters were 
interconnected.  
Unable to measure projectile never 
sensed and reported status during 
flight duration. 
Interference Monitor network behavior for 
existence of interference. 
None noted during experiments. 
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The following paragraph describes the analysis that drove further prototype 
revisions. Table 8 contains a summary of the analysis. 
Table 8.   Phase III, Prototype 4 Specific Observations 
Component Observation Modification 
Descent 
Mechanism 
Unreliable performance Remove from follow-on prototypes 
Power supply 2 of 7 trials killed the battery. 
This is likely because of the 
added impact at launch due to 
increased size and weight of 
Prototype 4 




Removing the descent 
mechanism provides the 
opportunity to remove most 
internal components: 
microprocessor, accelerometer, 
barometer, and tilt sensor 
Remove all unnecessary components 
from follow-on prototypes. 
   
 
We included a parachute in all previous prototypes for two reasons: in order to 
increase flight time and in order to protect the payload. However, our Phase II and Three 
experiments proved that the payload remains intact after landing on grass and that the 
flight time without the parachute functioning provides sufficient opportunity for a 
message to be transmitted across the network. We therefore decided to simplify our 
prototype for future experiments. We decided to remove the parachute and simplify the 
program sketch. With the parachute removed, we were also able to eliminate the 
accelerometer, barometer, tilt sensor, parachute, plunger, springs, servo, and lever. With 
many of the components removed, we decided we did not require an Arduino either. We 
therefore designed Prototype 5 as a VEmesh module powered by the battery inside a 
small 3D printed assembly. Prototype 5 is depicted in Figure 46. 
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Figure 46.  Prototype 5  
We designed Prototype 5 to turn on only after launch. The small roller switch that 
provided on-off functionality is visible in Figure 46. Prototype 5 would power on, join 
the network, and then act solely as a relay for the duration of flight. Prototype’s simple 
design promised to produce fewer points of failure. However, upon testing Prototype 5, 
we discovered some surprising and important network behaviors. The following 
paragraphs describe the bench testing and our network behavior observations. Table 9 







Table 9.   Phase III, Prototype 5, Network Behavior Observations 




Virtual Extension introduces 
power to the VEmesh module in a 
progressive manner upon start up, 
from no power to full power over a 
given time. 
VEmesh module components are 
better protected by the slow power 
on process. However, time 
required for network to converge is 
extended  
Pseudo-Random 
Hops (Layer 2) 
Virtual Extension’s Frequency 
Hopping Spread Spectrum 
Approach uses a default 21 
frequencies to hop across using a 
pseudo-random code. Value can be 
changed from 51 to 1. 
Network converged in 14 seconds 
with 21 frequency default. 
Network converged in 8 seconds 
when hopping on just one 
frequency. 
 
We designed a ground-based test how our network would behave during Prototype 
5’s flight. We programmed the VEmesh user interface to produce an audible beep 
whenever it received data from the remote node. Then we relocated the remote node from 
the VEmesh gateway so that the audible beeping stopped. Physically, the beeping stopped 
at around 100 meters with line-of-sight separation. We placed Prototype 5 within LOS of 
both the remote node and the VEmesh gateway. Then, with a timer, we measured the 
time from switching on Prototype 5’s power to the first audible beeps at the VEmesh user 
interface. Figure 47 shows the ground test design. 
  
Figure 47.  Prototype 5 Ground Test Design 
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In all of our tests, audible beeping began at an average of 13 seconds after sending 
power to Prototype 5. Since the flight time for our projectiles was previously 6–8 seconds 
without the parachute deploying, we knew we had a problem if we wanted to continue to 
limit our transmission to the duration of flight. We wondered how we were able to 
transmit data inside of the flight windows during the previous phases of our experiment. 
New variables in our experiment included delaying powering on the projectile until 
launch and excluding the Arduino microprocessor. We suspected that network activity 
occurred in previous models as we prepared to fire. Specifically, the projectile’s VEmesh 
module acquired the network while in proximity with the VEmesh gateway before 
launch. Conversely, when powering on after launch, we ensured that all the network 
traffic concerned with the OSI model’s layers was accounted for during flight. Further, 
we suspected that the delayed network convergence was due to protocol activity at layers 
2 and 3 in the OSI model. Specifically, we thought that the FHSS that enables Simulcast 
was the root cause of the additional delay. We needed to find out how a node just joining 
the network receives the pseudo-random code and the timing that the network is hopping 
across.  
We contacted Virtual Extension and learned that our VEmesh radios used a default 
21 different frequencies to hop between and that the number of frequencies was 
programmable. Virtual Extension allows the network programmer to use as many as 50 
frequencies or as few as one. We chose to reduce the number of frequencies to one. With 
the VEmesh gateway and all nodes programmed to use a single frequency, we returned to 
the test illustrated in Figure 47. We suspected that we would be able to significantly 
reduce the delay from the original 13 seconds. To our surprise, however, the audible 
beeping still began at an average of 8 seconds after sending power to Prototype 5.  
We again contacted Virtual Extension. This time we learned that Virtual Extension 
uses hardware that slowly introduces power over the circuit upon start. By slowing the 
introduction of power, Virtual Extension decreases the risk of burning a component on 
the circuit. Since the VEmesh product we used was originally designed as a mesh 
network of remote sensors in agricultural scenarios, the slight delay in acquiring the 
network was never a complaint from users. For agricultural users, slow power increases 
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the likelihood that each VEmesh module lasts longer, which is a desirable feature. 
However, for our purpose of use inside a short-living node, the delay becomes 
unacceptable. We had several options. We could power Prototype 5 before launch, we 
could adjust our design variables and search for longer-living nodes, or we could allow 
Prototype 5 to relay from the ground after landing. After deliberation, we decided that we 
had observed sufficient criteria for our study to make observations. Thus, we decided to 
conclude our campaign of experimentation. 
B. ANALYSIS 
This section provides a broad-perspective analysis of the campaign of 
experiment’s results. We begin the analysis with our own working model that drives the 
need for short-living networks. This model is created using the systems theory framework 
discussed in Chapter III. We follow the model with an analysis of the desirable features 
of a short-living node within a bursty network. We use the OSI model discussed in 
Chapter III to logically categorize our desirable features. We then conclude the analysis 
with a network-level perspective on functionality and security. We use the CIA triad from 
Chapter III as a rubric for the functionality and security analysis. 
1. A Model for Operating Short-Living Networks 
Our campaign of experiments explored the proposition that a force can conduct 
command and control by using bursts in a short-living network. We considered how a 
force might actually employ bursts during a tactical operation. We also considered the 
influences affecting a force’s decision to emit signals. The need to coordinate seems to 
balance with probability of EM detection in a traditional cat and mouse game. Figure 48 




Figure 48.  A Model for Operating Short-Living Networks 
From a systems theory perspective, we believe that a force’s critical 
communication needs can serve as a feedback loop that drives the physical existence of 
the network itself, and in doing so, provide passive defensive countermeasures while the 
force operates in an EM-hostile environment. We created a self-balancing system to 
illustrate how communication requirements during a tactical scenario are offset by the 
probability that the force will be targeted through those communications.  
Our model for disruption-based networking functions within a self-balancing 
system with two interacting feedback loops. In Figure 48’s critical knowledge loop, a 
tactical force maintains a perception of shared knowledge. For instance, imagine a 
company that conducts a final brief and rehearsal with the commander. The platoons 
depart to begin the operation. Each platoon perceives that they are “on the same page” as 
the other platoons. Each platoon has some conception of how the mission should go if 
their company is to be successful. Now, imagine that one of the platoons observes a 
departure from how the mission is supposed to go. There may be an ambush by the 
enemy or some civilians where none were expected. That platoon perceives a gap in 
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shared knowledge with the company and has a greater desire to communicate over the 
network. Likewise, if there is no ambush or no civilians, the platoon does not perceive a 
change in shared knowledge and does not believe there exists a need to communicate. 
That is how the Critical Knowledge Loop works in Figure 48. The perceived gap in 
shared knowledge influences the force’s desire to establish a short-living network. If the 
team believes the shared knowledge gap is great or urgent, they will feel a great need to 
shoot the projectile and transmit critical data in order to close the shared knowledge gap. 
When the network is created, information flows and the gap in shared knowledge closes. 
The force “gets on the same page.”  
The observed departure from the path to the desired tactical outcome injects into 
the critical knowledge loop in Figure 48. The ambush scenario illustrates one of these 
injects. Intelligence requirement discovery may also serve as observable criteria in a 
tactical scenario experiment. Intelligence requirements (IR) are defined as requirements 
for intelligence to fill gaps in the command’s knowledge and understanding of the 
battlespace or enemy forces (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2010). IRs are typically missing 
pieces of information about the enemy that a commander needs to know to make a sound 
decision. IRs can be classified as commanders’ critical intelligence requirements (CCIR) 
and priority information requirements (PIR), which are those IRs deemed critical to 
facilitating timely decision making and IRs stated as a priority for intelligence support 
respectively.  
The EM Detection Loop in Figure 48 is a counter-balancing influence in our 
model. The EM Detection Loop is connected to the Critical Knowledge Loop by the 
network existence time element. That is, the time that the temporary network emits 
detectable signals gives the adversary more opportunities to detect and target the platoons 
in the scenario. The platoons in the company understand that direct correlation between 
network existence and the probability that they will be targeted. There is another 
significant element in the EM Detection Loop, though. That significant element is the 
company’s perception of the risk of detection and targeting. Perception of detection risk 
depends on confirming information about the enemy’s EM capability. For instance, if the 
enemy is not known to be able to target using the EM spectrum, the company is free to 
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emit any signal they want. Persistent signals networks used in previous DOD operations 
are an example of a negligible force from EM detection loop.  
If the enemy is known to be adept at EM detection and geolocation, the force will 
perceive that detection is probable. When EM detection is possible or probable, the EM 
detection loop activates. The force from the EM detection loop changes the equation for 
network creation, dissuading the force from creating the network and communicating 
freely. No force wants to be targeted, so the force will only create the network until the 
knowledge gap becomes absolutely critical.  
The self-balancing model is simply a model we’ve developed based on our 
understanding for the driving factors for bursty networks in tactical scenarios. Its purpose 
is to explain both why bursty networking may become necessary and how a force will 
balance network creation versus targeting by the adversary. In the next section, we 
provide our analysis on desirable qualities of short-living nodes using the OSI model. 
C. OPEN SYSTEMS INTERCONNECT (OSI) ANALYSIS 
The following subsections organize our findings by layer of the OSI model. Each 
layer will include a description of the protocols exhibited in our experiments and then 
some recommended protocols for inclusion in future experiments. In order to give those 
recommendations, we need to identify our underlying assumptions about operating bursty 
networks in the future operating environment. The next paragraphs describe those 
assumptions.  
We make three major underlying assumptions about operating communication 
networks in the future operating environment. The first major underlying assumption is 
that persistent signals are more likely to be detected by adversaries. Furthermore, those 
adversaries will be able to geo-locate and target our forces using the signals that they are 
able to detect. The second major assumption is that strict emission control, also known as 
going radio silent, will be a sub-optimal option because the clusters need to act in a 
coordinated manner in order to produce mission success. 
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The third major underlying assumption is the most technical. We believe that end-
to-end connections communication links across disparate clusters will not be feasible to 
maintain persistently during a single burst of the network. We believe this to be true of 
the network in a gamut of scenarios: naval warfare scenario in the littorals, in urban 
combat, or in reconnaissance missions. In fact, we believe that an end-to-end connection 
may not be possible to maintain within between nodes within a single cluster for long 
enough to support a communication session. Figure 49 illustrates these assumptions with 
a simple diagram clusters A, B, and C. The nodes that are within signal range of each 
other are connected by a dotted line. As Figure 49 shows, the upper left-most node in 
cluster A can reach the most remote nodes in cluster B, but no link is established to 
cluster C.  
 
Figure 49.  Clusters A, B, and C 
In Figure 49, intermediate clusters B can not be relied upon to maintain an end-to-
end connection between clusters A and C in figure 49. There are several reasons why. 
The first reason is that the mobility of the nodes within the clusters will cause frequent 
network topology changes that will not be mapped by clusters A, B, or C without 
network messages. Those network messages are not possible without transmitting a 
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signal that is detectable by an adversary. The second reason is that we believe that signals 
that are powerful enough to reach from cluster A all the way to the cluster C, even in a 
burst, increase the risk of an adversary detect the signal. Clusters A and C may be 
separated by 100 meters or 100 kilometers. Additionally, there may be many intermediate 
cluster Bs between sending cluster A and receiving cluster C. Each intermediate cluster B 
exercises various levels of mobility that would be strictly limited if they participate in an 
end-to-end communication session between clusters A and C. Active participation by 
intermediate nodes and clusters results in more signals being emitted, which also 
increases the risk that an adversary will detect and target our forces. 
To demonstrate our assumptions, imagine an amphibious raid scenario where a 
naval force launches elements of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) into an urban 
area. Imagine that the adversary has proven an ability to target through EM detection, and 
that intelligence believes that the adversary can geo-locate signals if they persist for more 
than 30 seconds. Figure 49’s clusters A in our imaginary scenario is the raid element of 
two Marine platoons which are represented as four Marine squads. Cluster B could be the 
rotary-wing assets providing them lift from ship to landing zone. If there were more than 
one Cluster Bs, suppose that those are comprised of patrol craft and UAV clusters. 
Cluster C consists the ships of the amphibious readiness group (ARG)/MEU, including 
the Landing Force Operations Center (LFOC). Applying our assumptions to the 
imaginary scenario means that: 1) the Marine platoons are out of communications range 
with the LFOC unless they are serviced by intermediate cluster Bs, and 2) that 
intermediate clusters of rotary-wing lift, UAVs, and patrol craft will be moving as 
dictated by mission and force protection requirements, which result in different possible 
end-to-end links at any point in the operation.  
The following subsections detail the protocols in our experiments and provide our 
recommended protocols for inclusion in future experiments given our assumptions. 
Readers who require a more detailed description of the OSI model should refer to 
Chapter III.  
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1. Physical Layer 
The physical layer properties were of primary importance to this study, because 
protocols at all higher layers are translated into physical layer signals. Activity at higher 
layers that allow users to communicate over the network become a physical signal that an 
adept adversary can detect. We measured signal range at the physical layer but 
connection time at the application layer. Because we knew that our VEmesh radios were 
emitting signals as soon as they were powered, we did not need to devise additional 
means to measure total physical emission time that included every layer of network 
traffic. Our VEmesh modules were equipped with monopole antennas which produce the 
effect of an omni-directional signal. Equipped with low power, our range was less than 
200 meters.  
In a tactical context, an adversary with a receiver will be unable to detect a 
friendly signal if the signal is indiscernible from the background noise. The transmitter’s 
emission pattern and signal power are therefore major factors in detection. Outside of 
signal range, any receiver receives only what appears to be background noise. Omni-
directional antennas provide the same signal in nearly all directions while directional 
antennas emit the signal in a more focused trajectory. Adversaries can position receivers 
anywhere within proximity of omni-directional antennas in order to detect friendly 
signals, while they have to be either in the pattern of a directional antenna or within one 
of the typical side-lobes. There is a trade-off in antenna choice. The more directional an 
antenna, the more aimed it must be in order to establish a successful connection. Aiming 
requires a priori knowledge of the location of the recipient. That knowledge will typically 
require that mobile nodes communicate their positions frequently, which may not be 
feasible or desireable under EM-hostile conditions. 
Another physical layer consideration is data encoding. Selecting an appropriate 
data encoding technique is often a calculated trade-off between maximizing data 
throughput and finding an acceptable error rates in a given environment. We did not 
capture the encoding technique used with the VEmesh radios in our experiments. We did 
set bits per second to 2400, which was the maximum value offered in the Virtual 
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Extension interface. In future experiments, we recommend the continued balance 
between acceptable error rate, range, and maximum throughput. 
2. Data Link Layer 
Our VEmesh radios used a channelization protocol, FHSS. Channelization 
protocols generally require greater awareness of all nodes in the network in order to 
distribute the resources appropriately. In our experiments, a VEmesh module joining the 
network listened for the sequence of pseudo-random hops. Convergence time was 
approximately 13 seconds using the pre-set 22 number of frequencies. We reduced 
convergence time to 8 seconds by eliminating all hops. The additional overhead required 
to operate FHSS does reduce the routing message overhead at layer 3. VEmesh uses 
FHSS to drive its Simulcast routing at layer 3. The interaction between layers is an 
interesting point. In the VEmesh example, additional layer 2 message traffic virtually 
eliminates all required traffic at layer 3. This relationship between layers can be exploited 
if the tactical conditions permit. The perceived latency due to layer 2 message traffic may 
be able to be bypassed if conditions allow for all nodes to logically join the network 
before beginning the tactical scenario. As we demonstrated in our Phase II experiments, 
the nodes experienced virtually no delay in passing application layer traffic because they 
synchronized on the pseudo-random code and gained the timing from the VEmesh 
Gateway prior to shooting the projectile and placing the remote node. Applied to a 
tactical scenario, this means that if all nodes can synchronize before entering the range in 
which the adversary can detect using EM tools, sub-application layer message traffic can 
be reduced. 
We recommend exploring random access protocols in future experiments with 
distrupted tactical networks. Carrier Sensing Multiple Access (CSMA) – Collision 
Avoidance (CA) is a nice starting point. Random access protocols seem well-suited for 
short-living networks because the alternatives, controlled access and channelized 
protocols, require an layer 2 overhead that will be challenging to support under EM 
hostile conditions. The frequent network mapping messages will require many more 
bursts, which adds to the likelihood of detection. Layer 3 is discussed in the next section. 
 105 
3. Network Layer 
Our VEmesh radios employed Simulcast to perform the routing function resident 
at layer 3. The technical operation of Simulcast is discussed in depth in Chapter IV. The 
results of employing Simulcast in the network behavior are important to note. Simulcast 
routing, because of its unique channelization of time and frequency at layer 2, exhibits 
tremendous scalability. According to Virtual Extension (n.d.), the number of nodes in the 
network has virtually no limit. Additionally, once all nodes have joined, the network 
exhibits very little network traffic at layers 2 and 3. All nodes listen at synchronized 
moments at the same frequency dictated by the pseudo-random code. If no nodes have 
application layer messages to transmit, no transmissions are emitted across the network. 
If a node detects a message, that node will repeat the received message on the next 
frequency hop. We can call that hop two. That node will then listen to hop three, which 
gives the node feedback about message receipt by other nodes. According to Virtual 
Extension (n.d.), battery life is also saved by each node in the VEmesh network when 
compared with other networks that employ popular routing techniques like Optimized 
Link State Routing (OLSR) and Ad Hoc Distance Vector (AODV). FHSS and Simulcast 
allow VEmesh nodes to save battery life by listening only at given times, each time just 
for a few microseconds, as opposed to continuous listening for network management 
traffic. 
We recommend future disrupted tactical networking experiments include reactive 
routing protocols. In particular, we recommend observing how AODV implementations 
affect the network behavior during short-bursts. We do not believe that AODV is an 
exact fit for disrupted tactical networking in the future operating environment because it 
does not comply with our assumptions. AODV was designed with the assumption that an 
end-to-end link between sender and receiver is both possible and also maintainable for 
the duration of the communication session. 
4. Transport Layer 
TCP and UDP are the most common protocols at layer 4, but we do not believe 
that they are suitable given our assumptions about operating bursty networks in the future 
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operating environment. Like AODV and LSR at layer 3, TCP and UDP were designed 
with the assumption that end-to-end link with the idea of a communication session. In 
disruption-prone environment, an end-to-end connection may not be possible. We 
recommend including the DTN protocol in future experiments in disrupted tactical 
networking. NASA (n.d.) provides a downloadable software development kit on its 
website that will reduce the barrier for inclusion in future experiments. As discussed in 
chapter II, DTN allows each node along the route between a sender and receiver to store 
segments, called bundles, from the downstream node and then forwards the bundles to 
the upstream node when the connection with that node is possible. The question becomes, 
then, how nodes and clusters in disrupted tactical networks will identify up-stream and 
down-stream nodes when given sender and destination information. We propose 
approaching the answer to that question with the dual concepts of hierarchy and urgency 
precedence. 
Hierarchy seems like an appropriate method to inform nodes and clusters how to 
identify up-stream and down-stream nodes when given sender and destination 
information. We recommend applying hierarchy by combing signal range and node 
mobility with the organizational chart of the units involved. To demonstrate the hierarchy 
concept, imagine again the amphibious raid scenario discussed at the beginning of 
Section C in this chapter. Recall that two Marine platoons were represented by cluster A 
in figure 49, rotary wing assets that inserted them are represented by cluster B, and the 
ARG/MEU’s LFOC is cluster C. Not depicted are additional cluster Bs, comprised of 
various types of unmanned assets, and potentially patrol craft. We propose a hierarchical 
system in which the LFOC has the highest local precedence. We assign the ARG/MEU 
LFOC to a hierarchy level 5. Along with its placement high in the tactical scenario’s 
organizational chart, the LFOC typically has the best available power source inherent on 
the amphibious ship, the strongest signal range to resident communication systems, and 
the greatest overall mobility. Lowest in our proposed hierarchical system is cluster A. 
Comprised of Marine platoons with the least mobility, cluster A’s radios have the least 
signal range and are reliant upon battery power. We assign cluster A hierarchy level 1. 
The intermediate cluster Bs can fill the middle of the hierarchy. We assign hierarchy 
 107 
level 2 to the unmanned assets. They too rely upon batteries to power their 
communications systems, but have greater mobility than the Marine platoons. Their 
limited dwell time makes them well-suited to serve as intermediate nodes in the disrupted 
tactical network. The unmanned assets may frequently return to patrol craft or the 
ARG/MEU to recharge. We assign patrol craft to hierarchy level 3. Patrol craft can rely 
on engine power for their communication platforms and they have comparable mobility 
to the unmanned assets. Patrol craft can dwell longer than the unmanned assets. We 
assign the rotary wing assets to hierarchy level 4. The rotary wing assets have greater 
mobility than the patrol craft although they typically have more limited dwell time. 
Rotary wing assets rely upon engines to power their communications platforms. Table 10 
captures the scenario hierarchy. 







1 Limited mobility and speed, reduced signal 




2 Average mobility and high speed, reduced 





3 Increased mobility and average speed, engine 





4 High mobility and high speed, engine power 
for greater signal range, while dwell time 
determined by fuel 
C ARG/MEU 
LFOC 
5 High mobility and average speed, engine 
power for greater signal range, more diverse 
communication platforms. High in 
organizational chart. 
 
While hierarchy is a promising method to inform nodes of up-stream and down-stream 
locations, urgency precedence promises to assist the force in disciplining the EM signals 
in order to reduce the likelihood of detection. To demonstrate the urgency concept, 
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suppose that we design urgency precedence classifications as “URGENT,” “PRIORITY,” 
or “ROUTINE.” Messages from cluster A, intermediate clusters B, as well as from 
cluster C are classified with an urgency precedence based on their importance to the 
execution of the tactical scenario. For instance, imagine that the Marine platoons have 
discovered a CCIR during their raid that they need to send back to the LFOC. Suppose 
that reception of this CCIR by the LFOC is essential to the operation. The Marine 
platoon’s message is assigned “URGENT” precedence. When the “URGENT” message 
is transmitted from a node in the platoon, all like-nodes within signal range transmit their 
own messages in order to identify all nodes within their own signal range. By doing so, 
they leverage their geographical separation to increase the likelihood of reaching a node 
from a higher level in the hierarchy.  
Figure 50 demonstrates network behavior during a burst intended to transmit an 
“URGENT” message from cluster A. The dotted lines represent the known network 
topology by the nodes, mapped by layer 2 and 3 message traffic at the beginning of the 
burst. The colored circles represent the detectable signal area, produced by the signal 
range of each node participating in the burst. 
 
Figure 50.  Network Topology During “URGENT” Message Burst 
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Ideally, and end-to-end link might be temporarily established between the platoon and the 
LFOC on ship. As depicted in Figure 50, the platoons in cluster A do not establish a link 
to the LFOC in cluster C. If no end-to-end link is possible, the nodes establish the best 
route, getting the messages as high as possible in terms of hierarchy level. The platoon’s 
“URGENT” CCIR is transmitted across the best route, and using DTN bundle concept it 
is stored at a higher level in the hierarchy. The storying nodes then assume responsibility 
for forwarding the “URGENT” CCIR in subsequent bursts, which would occur 
purposefully at a different time and place in order to reduce the chance of enemy 
detection and targeting. As depicted in figure 50, there may be many intermediate nodes 
between cluster A and cluster C that end up storing the “URGENT” message. Therefore, 
there must be a pre-planned method to sort out duplicate messages upon receipt by cluster 
C. Because of the scope of the sorting task and its correlation with security mechanisms, 
we address this consideration in Section D, along with the rest of our CIA triad analysis. 
To demonstrate the EM discipline that urgency precedence promises, consider the 
situation where more routine command and control information is being transmitted from 
the platoons to the LFOC over the horizon. Messages like location information and status 
reports would get the “ROUTINE” urgency precedence. When the node transmits the 
“ROUTINE” message during a burst, all nodes within signal range receive it. All nodes 
of the same hierarchy level choose not to retransmit the message. Any receiving node at a 
higher level in the hierarchy will store the “ROUTINE” message and assume 
responsibility for forwarding it during a future burst. By treating the “URGENT”, 
“PRIORITY”, and “ROUTINE” messages differently, the EM signal is disciplined. 
“URGENT” messages result in bigger, longer, and more frequent bursts, while 
“ROUTINE” messages only occur during pre-existing bursts, and are they are not 
repeated, which reduces the length and effective signal range of the burst. Figure 51 
shows the left upper node in cluster A attempting to transmit a “ROUTINE” message. 
Because of its precedence, the other nodes within cluster A do not join the burst. They 
simply allow for any node at a higher level in the hierarchy to receive the signal directly 
from the transmitting cluster A node. In this way, the burst becomes more of a blip. The 
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burst in Figure 51 has a smaller EM signal than the burst depicted in Figure 50, and it 
would have a much shorter duration because no logical links are established.  
 
Figure 51.  First Example of Network Topology during “ROUTINE” 
Message Burst 
Figure 52 shows another example of a “ROUTINE” message burst. In Figure 52, 
a cluster A node successfully links with a node in cluster B. Compared with the burst in 
Figure 51, the burst is slightly larger and would persist for slightly longer. However, the 
“ROUTINE” message bursts are still less significant events than the “URGENT” burst 
from Figure 50. 
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Figure 52.  Second Example of Network Topology during “ROUTINE” 
Message Burst 
5. Application Layer 
The widest variety of protocols reside at the application layer. In our hypothetical 
disrupted tactical network in the future operating environment, a variety of protocols are 
likely to support command and control functions. We recommend CoT for inclusion in 
future experiments. CoT basic elements “what, when, and where” support a common 
operational picture for the force, but can also be used to help the network nodes predict 
the network topology. Imagine that CoT information was included in the message traffic 
that occurred during the bursts in Figures 50, 51, and 52. Although many cluster A nodes 
did not participate in the bursts, those within signal range received the transmissions. We 
hypothesize that the nodes can use the CoT information they received to predict what 
their network topology could be during the next burst. If our hypothesis is true, it may be 
feasible for the nodes to then exercise additional EM discipline. A node that knows that 
no higher-level nodes were present during a recent burst may decide not to create another 
burst for a “ROUTINE” message.  
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Our layer by layer recommendations will require a great amount of future 
experimentation. We were functionally constrained to use the protocols that came with 
our VEmesh radios during our experiments. We believe there is tremendous value in 
testing other protocols in similar experiments. Our future experiments will compare how 
the network behaves while operating with CSMA-CA with AODV to the network 
behavior in our experiments with FHSS with Simulcast. After that work, our future 
experiments will investigate how the disrupted tactical network behaves with DTN-
enabled nodes. Finally, if we can overcome our functional constraints to design our own 
protocols, we will test our hypotheses that the hierarchy concept can give DTN-enabled 
nodes a means to determine upstream and downstream nodes given sender and receiver 
information and that the urgency concept can discipline the EM signal in the network. 
The next section provides a security analysis using the CIA triad. 
D. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
This section provides our analysis of the security considerations for tactical 
disrupted networks. We organize this section using the CIA triad. Although we did not 
use security protocols as design criteria in our experiments, we made security 
observations during our network behavior analysis.  The recommendations in this section 
are preliminary, high level in nature.  
As discussed in Chapter III, network managers strive to achieve balance between 
the elements in the CIA triad. Our discovery experiments with availability as the prime 
consideration. We wanted the proof of concept to show that forces can access, send, and 
receive information through bursts. Confidentiality and integrity were secondary goals in 
our study. We wanted to consider methods to support confidentiality and integrity in 
future disrupted tactical networks, but designing experiments to test those methods had to 
be left for future work. In terms of confidentiality, we wanted to consider methods to 
prevent an adversary from detecting, intercepting, and understanding the information. We 
did not include EM detection tools and an opposing force in our experiments. That is left 
for future work. In terms of integrity, we wanted to consider methods to ensure that 
information is received without being modified, whether intentionally or unintentionally. 
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We included authenticity in the integrity element of the CIA triad. We wanted to consider 
methods that the receiver can verify that the sender is a known and trusted part of the 
friendly force. We also wanted to consider methods to ensure that a message is not 
replayed, intentionally or otherwise. In Section C, we demonstrated the need to sort 
duplicate messages that are received through the multiple possible paths in a disrupted 
tactical network. Recall the Chapter III example that an “URGENT” call for fire is 
replayed. Without mechanisms to de-conflict multiple requests, fires could be sent to 
locations that friendly forces have subsequently entered. Finally, we wanted to consider 
methods to support non-repudiation in a disrupted tactical network. Specifically, we 
wanted to consider methods that the sender receives notification that a message was 
received by the target recipient, and secondarily that the intended receiver would be 
unable to deny having received the information.  
Our security analysis is framed with the same underlying assumptions about 
disrupted tactical networks we listed in Section C. Those assumptions include that: 1) 
persistent signals are more likely to be detected by adversaries, 2) strict emission control, 
also known as going radio silent, will sub-optimal due to the coordination required 
between clusters in order to produce mission success, and 3) end-to-end connections 
communication links between nodes and between clusters will not be achievable or 
maintainable to support a communication session model.  
1. Availability Analysis 
Availability was of primary importance to our experiments. As a first step, we 
needed to prove that short-living nodes could support data transfer during a burst. In 
laymans terms, the network just needed to work. It is likely that availability will remain 
of primary importance in future work. It is well-known that availability can be impacted 
by the mechanisms that are intended to ensure confidentiality and integrity. Therefore, we 
want to seek ways to minimize the network traffic of protocols supporting confidentiality 
and integrity. 
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2. Confidentiality Analysis 
This section provides a high-level analysis of achieving confidentiality while 
operating a disrupted tactical network. Chapter III discussed common methods to achieve 
confidentiality in persistent networks and why those methods are likely to perform sub-
optimally in bursty networks. According to Scott and Burleigh (2007), the DTN protocol 
suite was designed with security in mind. The DTN protocol suite has the Bundle 
Security Protocol (BSP), which requires an in-depth analysis for suitability in a disrupted 
tactical environment. We recommend the in-depth analysis be completed in future 
experiments implementing DTN. 
In broad terms, however, there are several available encryption schemes to 
support confidentiality and integrity when end-to-end communication sessions can not be 
supported. The first option is to create miniature sessions between each linked node. The 
next option is to use an asymmetric key approach like PKI. The sending node encrypts 
the application layer data with the target recipient’s public key. A third option is to 
employ a symmetric key for all nodes in the friendly network. During a miniature session 
between nodes, key exchange or key generation is possible. However, the network traffic 
overhead to create sessions between links is likely to reach unacceptable levels. An 
asymmetric approach requires all nodes to possess all other nodes’ public keys before an 
operation begins. The pre-distribution of keys is required because, presumably, without 
being able to support end-to-end links, employing a key distribution method during an 
operation is not supportable. The asymmetric approach requires greater node memory 
than other approaches, but has promise in that the network traffic overhead is negligible. 
The third option we considered also has negligible overhead. If all nodes in the friendly 
network shared a symmetric key before an operation began, no added network traffic 
would be required to support encryption. However, as discussed in Chapter III, 
distributing symmetric keys poses a challenge to network managers and confidentiality is 
completely lost if an adversary that discovers the symmetric key. Given our broad 
perspective, we believe it is necessary to further investigate the asymmetric key 
approach.  
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3. Integrity Analysis 
This section provides a high-level analysis of achieving integrity while operating 
a disrupted tactical network. We analyze methods to verify message integrity, guard 
against replay, and provide the sender with notification that a message was received by 
the target recipient. We recommend that future work strive to prove the identity of the 
sender, prove that the message has not been modified, and that the message is unique. 
Many of the mechanisms that support confidentiality also support integrity. Therefore, 
recommendations from subsection 2 have bearing on this subsection. In particular, our 
asymmetric encryption recommendation seems well-suited to support integrity, protect 
against replay, and provide authentication. We recommend future work consider the use 
of a number once, called a nonce, hashes and message authentication codes that are 
supported by the smart use of public and private keys. 
Our recommendations in this section were provided from a high-level, cursory 
perspective. More work is required in order to gain greater fidelity. Our intent was to 
begin the research conversation with a well-rounded view of the disruption-based 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 In this study, we proved the feasibility of creating our own short-living nodes. We 
then used the nodes in small-scale experiments and were able to successfully retrieve 
command and control information from a remote sensor as well as transmit movement 
instructions to a UGV. Although we experienced challenges with node behavior and the 
included materials, the nodes proved sufficient for our study of information flow and 
network behavior. This chapter provides our conclusions and recommendations regarding 
information flow and network behavior. Many of the points are summarized from our 
detailed analysis provided in Chapter V. We also capture some high-level conclusions 
regarding future node design as well as emerging manufacturing technologies. 
This thesis was limited in several ways.  We limited its scope by remaining 
purposefully in the unclassified domain. We did not use electromagnetic detection tools 
in order to attempt to geo-locate our experimental nodes during the duration of their 
interactions. That was beyond the scope of this work. We also made no attempt to modify 
manufacturer-set protocols in order to optimize results. The reader should keep these 
limitations in mind when considering the following conclusions and recommendations. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Our conclusions are organized into system-level observations, prototyping 
process, network behavior by layer, and security considerations.   
1. System-Level Observations 
The need to conduct command and control must balance with the probability that 
an adversary will detect and target a friendly force that is using EM signals.  In figure 48, 
we provided a self-balancing model that roughly follows a traditional cat and mouse 
system. The model adequately captures both the tactical decision to employ short-living 
networks in a tactical situation and the impetus to develop alternative networking means 
such as networking by burst.  Because recent adversaries have been unable to detect and 
target our forces by EM means, the DoD has enjoyed networking with the persistent 
signal model.  However, planners envision a future operating environment where a signal 
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detected is a signal targeted.  We hope that our model can serve as a starting point, 
improved through future research, and ultimately used by the future force. 
2. Prototyping Process 
We designed and created our own short-living nodes in order to study the 
behavior of short-living links. The process was iterative in nature. We used the Restech 
Norway Mini and 230 model pneumatic line throwers as surrogates for shoulder-fired 
grenade launchers. We compensated for the devastating launch pressures by suspending 
the projectiles in the barrel and by modifying production materials. Specifically, we 
added some structural integrity by 3D printing at greater in-fill percentages and we opted 
to switch to reductive manufacturing from aluminum and polyethylene stock on a CNC 
desktop mill. Prototype 3 was our first successful prototype, but we continued to 
incrementally improve its design.  The result of our incremental development was 
Prototype 5, a simplified version containing only a rolling switch, a battery, and the 
VEmesh module inside a 3D-printed body. We are excited about the future of prototyping 
in-house, which is becoming easier with technology maturation and the burgeoning 
popularity of at-home manufacturing. 
3. Network Behavior By Layer 
The required time that a network exists is the sum of the user-driven data at the 
application layer, plus all subordinate layered traffic that is designed to create the 
network.  In our experiments, the VEmesh technology provided some valuable insights.  
Simulcast routing removed the network requirement to transmit frequent routing 
messages in order to discover network nodes and maintain network topology awareness.  
However, the FHSS protocol suite that enabled Simulcast required that all nodes 
synchronize before beginning a mission.  Each node needed the Gateway’s timing and the 
pseudo-random code of frequency hops in order to participate in Simulcast.  We 
discovered with Prototype 5, that our VEmesh nodes required an average of 13 seconds 
to join the network if they were powered on only after launch.  We were able to reduce 
that time to 8 seconds when we lowered the number of possible frequencies.  However, 
we were unable to overcome the time required by the roll-on power scheme that protects 
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the components on the VEmesh circuit board, in order to successfully transmit 
application layer traffic during the projectile’s flight.  
In Chapter V we provided a layer-by-layer analysis of available protocols and 
provide our recommendations for their inclusion in future work. These recommendations 
are based on three underlying assumptions about networking in the future operating 
environment.  The three assumptions include: 1) that persistent signals are more likely to 
be detected by adversaries who are able to target our forces using their signals, 2) that 
strict radio silence will be sub-optimal because of the need to coordinate efforts in order 
to produce mission success, and 3) that end-to-end communication links across disparate 
clusters will not be feasible to maintain persistently during a single burst of the network. 
4. Security Considerations 
Security observations were inherent in our experiments because security is 
ultimately the impetus for departing from a persistent signal network.  An adversary can 
not penetrate a network that does not exist.  Likewise, an adversary must use other means 
to detect and target our forces if we do not emit EM signals.  Considering each element in 
the CIA triad, we regard additional security measures as necessary to protect against the 
real threats of replay and other electronic attacks.  Security objectives must be achieved 
by means that do not require a communication-session model of communication. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
This section makes recommendations for the next steps to develop disrupted 
tactical networks. This study focused on the creation of short-living nodes.  We believe 
future work should focus on short-living links.  The projectiles themselves were just one 
type of node.  A network of short-living nodes will feature multi-domain nodes.  Some 
nodes will be ground-based, others will be surface, sub-surface, aerial, and others may 
even have an orbital nature.  
Future work that is immediately pursuable is network behavior study and analysis 
of diverse protocols inherent in commercially-available mesh radios.  GoTenna (n.d.) 
recently released a mesh version of their products that are designed for use in areas not 
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serviced by cellular companies. Persistent Systems’ Wave Relay radios provide another 
system that is readily available for immediate testing. We recommend comparing the 
network behavior of assets that use CSMA-CA at layer 2 and AODV at layer 3 with our 
VEmesh TDMA, FHSS, and Simulcast observations.   
We also recommend future tests with DTN-enabled nodes.  We believe DTN is a 
good fit given our assumption that end-to-end connections will not be possible in the 
future operating environment.  We recommend developing protocols to give the DTN-
enabled nodes a method to determine whether a sender is up-stream and down-stream 
relative to the target recipient of a given message.  We suggest a hierarchical method 
based on the organizational hierarchy and relative mobility of the nodes.  We also suggest 
applying an urgency precedence in order to exercise greater EM discipline in the 
network.  An “URGENT” message can produce a different network behavior than the 
behavior produced by a “ROUTINE” message if designed into the protocol. 
Finally, we recommend incorporating EM detection and geolocation tools into 
future experimentation.  By designing future experiments to include an opposing force 
with real EM detection and geolocation capabilities, which would provide insight about 
the allowable duration of a single burst and present the opportunity to further refine our 
proposed systems-theory model for operating short-living networks. 
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APPENDIX A. ARDUINO TIMER SKETCH 
Appendix A is the very basic Arduino Sketch that drove Prototype 1.  
 
/*  Timed Parachute Release 





Servo myservo;  // create servo object to control a servo 
// twelve servo objects can be created on most boards 
 
void setup() { 
    delay(2000);} 
 
void loop() { 
    myservo.attach(3);   //connect servo on pin 3 
    myservo.write(0);  //tell servo to begin at pos 0 
    delay(500);    
    myservo.write(90);     // tell servo to go to position 90 
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APPENDIX B. PROTOTYPE 3 SKETCH 
Appendix B is the Arduino Sketch driving Prototype 3.  This sketch was designed 
by Naval Postgraduate School Researcer,  Eugene Bourakov. 
 
/--------------------------------------------------- 











// software serial #1: RX = digital pin 8, TX = digital pin 9 
SoftwareSerial radioPort(8, 9); 
 
Servo myservo;  // Calls Servo Library 
 
int STATUS_LED = 13; 
int TILTBALL_PIN = 7; 
const int axisXpin = A3;  
long cntRst=0; 
float baseAlt=0; 
const int numReadings = 5;  // for moving average filtering 










int afterLaunchDelay=90;  // delay at least 1 second to strat sensing tilt ball 
float speedOfPressureChange=0; 
 





    Serial.begin(9600); 
    radioPort.begin(9600); 
    pinMode(STATUS_LED, OUTPUT); 
    pinMode(TILTBALL_PIN, INPUT);     
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    if (!bme.begin()) {   
      Serial.println(F("Could not find a valid BMP280 sensor, check wiring!")); 
      while (1); 
    } 
     
    Serial.println("Projectile payload ready"); 
       //SSDdisplay.begin(SSD1306_SWITCHCAPVCC, 0x3C);  // initialize with the I2C addr 0x3C 
(for the 128x64) 
    //SSDdisplay.display(); 
    //displayInit(); 
    //delay(1000); 
         
} 
//--------------------------------------------------- 
void loop() { 
       String inData=""; 
        while (radioPort.available() > 0) { 
        char inByte = radioPort.read(); // Receive a single character from the software serial port 
        inData.concat(inByte);        // Add the received character to the receive buffer 
        if (inByte == 13) 
        {           
            parseInData(inData); 
            inData = ""; 
        } 
    } 
 
    if(cntRst%5 ==0){ 
      // check speed every 100 ms 
      speedOfPressureChange=getSpeedOfPressureChange(); 
      if(speedOfPressureChange>0.0)    Serial.println(speedOfPressureChange); 
    } 
     
    //if(!LAUNCHED && abs(analogRead(axisXpin))>accelerationThreshold ){ 
    if(INITIALIZED && !LAUNCHED && (speedOfPressureChange>1.5 || 
abs(analogRead(axisXpin))>accelerationThreshold) ){ 
      Serial.println("launched"); 
      LAUNCHED=true;   
      cntRst=0; 
    } 
     
    if (digitalRead(TILTBALL_PIN) == HIGH && LAUNCHED && !DEPLOYED && 
cntRst>afterLaunchDelay) {   
      deployParachute(); 
    } 
     
    if(LAUNCHED && DEPLOYED &&  TRANSMIT && cntRst>100){ 
      // continue to transmit for a second to send deployment status 
      TRANSMIT=false;  
      cntRst=0; 
    } 
     
    if(LAUNCHED && DEPLOYED &&  !TRANSMIT && cntRst>100 && 
abs(analogRead(axisXpin))<accelerationThreshold/3){ 
      Serial.println(analogRead(axisXpin)); 
      Serial.println("touchdown"); 
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      TOUCHDOWN=true;   
      TRANSMIT=true; 
      //cntRst=0; 
    } 
     
    updateGCS(); 
     
    cntRst+=1; 
     
    if(DEPLOYED && cntRst>6000) {       
      // re-initialize in about 30 seconds after deployment 
       initPayload();  
    } 
 
    if(!INITIALIZED && cntRst>200) { 
      // after about a second initialize altitude measurements to zerose AGL 
      blinkLED(STATUS_LED); 
      INITIALIZED=true; 
      initPayload(); 
    } 
     
    //  main cycle takes about 20ms 
    //delay(1); 
} 
//--------------------------------------------------- 
void updateGCS() { 
   
    char buf[100]; 
    int 
payloadStatus=getBooleanInt(LAUNCHED)+2*getBooleanInt(DEPLOYED)+4*getBooleanInt(TO
UCHDOWN); 
    String myString="1 "+String(millis())+" "+String(int(getAlt()-baseAlt))+" "+String(payloadStatus); 
    //Serial.println(myString);         
    myString.toCharArray(buf,myString.length()+1);   
    if(TRANSMIT) { 
      //Serial.println(myString);         
      radioPortSendOut(buf); 
    } 
} 
//--------------------------------------------------- 
int getBooleanInt(boolean val){ 
  return  val ? 1  : 0; 
} 
//--------------------------------------------------- 
float getSpeedOfPressureChange() { 
  //int h=millis()-prevMillis;   
 int  h=50;  
  
  // get derivative with  dy/dx=(y(x+h)-y(x))/h   
  
  float deltaPressure=abs(bme.readPressure()-prevPressure); 
  prevPressure=bme.readPressure(); 
  // or dy/dx=(y(x+h)-y(x-h))/2h 
  // will try later 
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  return deltaPressure/h; 
   
  // or with 3-points method 
  // y(1)'=(y(-1)-4*y(0)+3*y(1))/2*h 
  //float deltaPressure=prevprevPressure-4*prevPressure+3*bme.readPressure(); 
  //float deltaPressure=-prevprevPressure-0*prevPressure+bme.readPressure(); 
  //prevprevPressure=prevPressure; 
  //prevPressure=bme.readPressure(); 
  //return deltaPressure/2*h; 
   
} 
//--------------------------------------------------- 
float getAlt() { 
    float alt=bme.readAltitude(1031.00);  
    int i; 
    for(i=1;i<numReadings;i++){ 
      ma[i-1]=ma[i]; 
    } 
    ma[numReadings-1]=alt; 
    float sum=0; 
    for(i=0;i<numReadings;i++){ 
      sum+=ma[i]; 
    } 
    alt=sum/numReadings; 
     
    return alt;   
} 
//--------------------------------------------------- 
void radioPortSendOut(char* buf) { 
    radioPort.write(buf); 
    radioPort.write(13); 
    //blinkLED(STATUS_LED); 
} 
//--------------------------------------------------- 
void blinkLED(int pin) { 
    digitalWrite(pin, HIGH);   // turn the LED on (HIGH is the voltage level) 
    delay(10);              // wait for a second 
    digitalWrite(pin, LOW);    // turn the LED off by making the voltage LOW 
} 
//--------------------------------------------------- 
void parseInData(String inData) { 
    String header=""; 
    String cmd=""; 
    Serial.println(inData); 
    if(inData.indexOf("#")>0){ 
      inData.toUpperCase(); 
      header=inData.substring(0,inData.indexOf("#")); 
      cmd=inData.substring(inData.indexOf("#")+1); 
      Serial.println(header+"  "+cmd); 
       
      if(cmd.startsWith("INIT")) { 
        initPayload(); 
      } 
       
      if(cmd.startsWith("DEPLOY")) { 
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        deployParachute(); 
      } 
    } 




void initPayload() { 
    LAUNCHED=false; 
    DEPLOYED=false; 
    TOUCHDOWN=false; 
    baseAlt=getAlt(); 
    cntRst=0;     
    TRANSMIT=true; 
    servoControl(90);  //set to init position 
    Serial.println("initialized"); 
} 
//--------------------------------------------------- 
void deployParachute() {  
    LAUNCHED=true; 
    DEPLOYED=true; 
    updateGCS(); 
    servoControl(0); 
    cntRst=0;  
    Serial.println("parachute deployed");  
} 
//--------------------------------------------------- 
void servoControl(int pos){   
    myservo.attach(6);  //connect servo on pin 6 
    delay(15); 
    myservo.write(pos); 
    delay(400); 





void displayInit() { 
  SSDdisplay.clearDisplay();   
  SSDdisplay.setTextSize(2); 
  SSDdisplay.setTextColor(WHITE); 
  SSDdisplay.setCursor(0,8); 
  SSDdisplay.println("  CENETIX"); 




void displayData() {  
  SSDdisplay.clearDisplay();   
  SSDdisplay.setTextSize(1); 
  //SSDdisplay.setTextColor(WHITE); 
  SSDdisplay.setCursor(0,0); 
  SSDdisplay.println("   CNTX Projectile"); 
  SSDdisplay.setCursor(0,10); 
  if(INITIALIZED) { 
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    SSDdisplay.println("AGL: "+String(getAlt()-baseAlt)+" meters"); 
  } else { 
    SSDdisplay.println("Alt: "+String(getAlt()-baseAlt)+" meters");   
  } 
  SSDdisplay.setCursor(0,20); 
  SSDdisplay.println("Tmp: "+String(float(bme.readTemperature())-4.0)+" C"); 






APPENDIX C. PHASE III EXPERIMENT 
Appendix C is extracted from the CENETIX campaign of experiments in fiscal 
year 2017. The below table summarizes the experiments Phase III of this thesis. The table 
was originally provided to all CENETIX participants for informational use. After the 
experiment, participants were provided a copy with the final results and analysis in text 
below the table. 
 
CENETIX EXPERIMENTS Appendix I (Part C, Phase II) to Annex C 
Short Title Projectile Network Testing—Camp Roberts, CA 
Phase Part A, Phase II (21 March) 
Experiment 
Objectives  




Current networking framework, that of persistent connection, is not suitable to operate 
under electromagnetically hostile conditions, especially when adversary can geo-locate. 
Research 
Questions 
1. Can critical information be transmitted using short-living networking nodes? 
2. What behavior is exhibited by layer of the OSI stack during transmission? 
3. How might projectiles be integrated into future scenarios of short-living networks? 
Technical 
Objectives 











1. Number of Nodes (3) 
2. Flight Time—PLT limits (10s) 
3. Internal components (VEMesh, Arduino) 
Criteria 1. UGV communication 
  
Location Camp Roberts, CA 
Date Tue, 21 March 
Players 
1. Monitoring and Control team (NPS) 




 CENETIX Testbed Portal 
 Deployable local MANET components 








 Wireless mesh network 
 Observer Notepad—not used 






1. Prepare the gateway, a projectile, and a UGV.  
2. Launch projectile. 








Bench test projectile, gateway, remote node functionality    1430-1500 1730-1800 
Shoot projectile, testing operation (repeat as needed)   1500-1700 1800-2000 
Shoot projectile, convey command to UGV   “ “ 
Recover equipment   1700-1730 2000-2030 
Hotwash    1730-1800 1730-1800 
 
RQ 1 
1. Can critical information be transmitted using short-living networking nodes? 
MoPs Data Collector 
a) Is data received at the remote node? How much? ENGR 
b) Is data received at the gateway? How much? ENGR 
c) What is the flight time? ENGR 
d) Length of time link is closed? ENGR 
  
RQ 2 
2. What behavior is exhibited by layer of the OSI stack during transmission? 
MoPs Data Collector 
a) Collect all communications by layer using sniffer for analysis. MEJIA 
  
RQ 3 
3. How might projectiles be integrated into future scenarios of short-living networks? 
MoPs Data Collector 
a) What are the characteristics of flight of the projectile? KLINE 
b) What is the signal range? KLINE 
c) What refinements can be made for future experiments? PI 






Network Logs  System Latency   
Tech Obsns 
 Network S/W issues 
 Network H/W issues 
Bourakov 
Bourakov 
Obsr Notepad  Text chat thread Wendt 






“PI”         - Bordetsky 
“NOCRear”   - x (at NPS) 
“TOC”       - Wendt 
“OPS”       - Mullins 
“ENG”       - Bourakov 





Notes: Ground test (no launch) successful.  
  6 launch tests: 
   1
st
: Battery fault, no power after shot. Parachute did not deploy. Since 
Arduino did not detect conditions for deployment, the projectile never sent C2 information to UGV. 
   2
nd
: Parachute did not deploy. Attempting to eliminate reasons to include: 
accelerometer malfunction & barometer malfunction (program logic requires either/or acceleration 
sensor or 10m altitude change to activate tilt sensor, which deploys parachute and begins 
projectile node communication), or reset sensor triggered during flight, or battery failure. 




: UGV conducted maneuvers, indicating that the data was received 
by the remote node. However, the projectile’s parachute did not deploy.  
 
Analysis: Parachute involved for 2 reasons: increase flight time and protect node. Node has 
proven to withstand impact on grass landings, and flight time without parachute is sufficient for 
messaging. Future prototype will eliminate mechanisms for parachute (accelerometer, barometer, 
tilt sensor, parachute, plunger, springs, servo, and lever).  
 Additionally, multiple impact revealed that the projectile shaft (came with PLT equipment) 
unscrews and has a cavity inside suitable for insertion of future prototype. Previously, the 
projectile shaft appeared as a single unit, its cap glued/fused to the body. In PLT3 prototype, we 
used it simply to absorb the impact of the launcher, push the projectile up, then separate. 
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